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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
As the United States vacillates between conventional military strategies and 
culturally attuned conflict resolution in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) there is 
an increased potential for cultural misunderstanding.  By expanding cultural awareness 
and an appreciation of cultural differences the need for hostile action and armed conflict 
is lessened and a better opportunity for peaceful alternatives exists.  At the forefront of 
any military operation is the corps of junior officers who lead Soldiers through assigned 
missions, regardless of national objective.  Working with, and through, their 
Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) these young lieutenants and captains are responsible 
for communication with a local populace and dynamic problem solving that involves 
mission-first orientation and cultural sensitivity.  What happens inside a city, village, 
field, or city-street reflects the leadership of the unit and success is the result of training 
and the discipline of the Soldiers involved.  With meaningful interactions with 
noncombatants becoming more frequent and more crucial to long-term stability than ever 
before, the professional education of the officers has to include issues related to culture. 
 The modern Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), officially established 
with the National Defense Act of 1916, is a college-based program that offers 
scholarships in exchange for military service as a commissioned officer.  According to a 
Department of Defense report on the military services (2004) an average of 54% of all 
Army officers (Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard) earned 
their commission through the ROTC.  Cadets receive a baccalaureate or masters‟ degree 
at an accredited college or university and are socialized into U.S. Army tradition and 
institutional practices through military science classes and field training exercises; 
including the 33- day long Leadership Development Assessment Course (LDAC) held 
every summer at Fort Lewis, Washington.  Graduates of the ROTC program, also known 
as the Basic Officer Leader Course I (BOLC I), become Second Lieutenants and are sent 
to various Army schools; including infantry training (BOLC II) and branch specific 
training (BOLC III), before reaching their first assignment as an officer- usually as a 
Platoon Leader in charge of 20 to 60 Soldiers.  Eventually, these men and women will be 
responsible for conducting a multitude of operations, in hostile and permissive 
environments, at home and abroad.   
Ball State University, located in Muncie, Indiana, has approximately 20,000 
students enrolled in 270 undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs 
(http://cms.bsu.edu/AdmissionsLanding/UndergaduateAdmissions/EnrollmentProfile.asp
x).  Of that number, approximately 100 students on campus participate in the ROTC 
program at any given time.  Like other students these cadets pursue a multitude of 
academic interests in business, architecture, history, criminal justice, nursing, and the 
social sciences.  They can be members of fraternities and intramural sports teams and 
they spend nights and weekends patrolling the party scene or hanging out in “the village” 
and at bars like The Herot or Doc‟s.  Others spend their free time at home in rented 
houses or dorms playing video games like Guitar Hero or participate in the otherworldly 
culture of the World of Warcraft.  Though many are in the National Guard quite a few 
also hold part-time jobs at nearby restaurants and retail chains.  A surprising number of 
cadets are married (7), getting married (5), or have children (4).  This demographic is not 
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unique on campuses across the country or even in other ROTC programs, but these facts 
of life are a part of American culture and this culture includes cadets carrying a 40 pound 
rucksacks and an M-16‟s through the woods once or twice a semester. 
This research argues that the culture of the cadet and future officer must be taken 
into account in order to conduct successful cultural awareness training.  Because an 
individuals‟ culture is the framework upon which all other cultural understanding is built 
it becomes necessary for the cadet to learn to recognize key components of his or her 
culture in addition to the culture of others.  Furthermore, the Ball State cadets interviewed 
in this research project have proved themselves to be critical thinkers and discerning 
users of cultural information.  When one cadet was asked how he would prepare himself 
to teach other Soldiers about culture he said,  
 
Getting away from the media, I think I would go and talk to as many Soldiers that have 
been in those environments and talk to them about the people they‟ve had to deal with 
and get the story first-hand from them.  What were the people like?  What were the not-
so friendly people like?  And how can I portray that to make sure we are accurately 
showing the cultures as the Soldiers see them…I would just say that I think it would be 
beneficial to see more cultural training.  With the new environment the United States 
Army is in right now, the predicament we are in, I think it is crucial to increase the 
culture awareness training to prepare the Soldiers for when the do deploy. 
 
This is not a unique sentiment.  Cadets know where to go find “good” cultural 
knowledge (from those who have experience with a particular culture) and they know 
what “bad” cultural information is (i.e. negative media portrayals).  But it is also the 
Army‟s responsibility to appropriately train cadets in the area well.  Though many of the 
interviewed cadets were unsure what or how American cultural factors would impact 
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cross-cultural communication two things was abundantly clear to cadets, 1) “given 
today‟s current situation…cultural awareness training is one-hundred percent crucial” 
and 2) “ROTC-wide it would be very beneficial to increase cultural awareness training.”  
Additionally, while cadets have expressed a desire for more cultural information on the 
people of Central Asia and the Middle East they were very clear on the fact that it was 
personal experience, not rank or orders, that for them constitutes reliable knowledge here.  
This is the primary measure they employ when looking for cultural knowledge.  Websites 
were a good source, but people were preferred.  Though a senior officer or NCO may not 
have deployed they can still provide valuable information about Army culture.  
Conversely, a Private First Class returning from his second deployment to Iraq would be 
seen as an important source for information about culture. 
 
Objective 
With the Army‟s continued involvement in multicultural environments, both 
foreign and domestic, it is imperative that appropriate culture literacy training becomes 
part of an officer‟s skill set as early and as often as possible.  While there have been few 
successful attempts to organize an immersive culture training inside all of the various 
ROTC programs around the country prior to 2007, U.S. Army Cadet Command has 
recently instituted (in a limited number of schools) a program that promotes the learning 
of foreign cultures and languages.  Beginning FY08, a limited number of cadets from 
select schools will be able to participate in specifically designated culture and language 
studies programs and will be able to apply for cultural immersion internships (news 
release from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense on May 08, 2007. On the 
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web at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseaid=10844).  This plan to 
build cultural competency and culturally relevant doctrine represents a significant 
improvement for the Army and ROTC largely because culture is now being recognized as 
a key component of global military operations, one that must be addressed and expanded 
on throughout an officer‟s career.   
During May through August 2007 Cadet Command began teaching a series of 
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLOs) at LDAC, its first cultural awareness training 
session designed for all cadets.  The significance of this event lies in the fact that 
approximately 5000 cadets participated in this training and their learning experiences that 
will contribute in some way to their yet-to-be-evaluated understanding of foreign cultures 
within a military context. 
 The purpose of this research is to determine what culture awareness, and Army 
awareness training, means to the cadets that attended LDAC in the summer of 2007.  One 
facet I will explore is the notion of culture as an obstacle.  While conducting this research 
the idea that culture could become an obstacle first revealed itself during the practical 
exercise portion of the TLOs.  Here the instructor told the assembled students that culture 
was important, something every Soldier and officer should be aware of, but a luxury 
when it came to completing the mission.  I was sitting in the bleachers watching members 
of my platoon role play a scenario in which they had to execute a “knock-and-search,” a 
common procedure Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan use when searching homes for 
weapons and other contraband.  When the cadets were thwarted by cultural taboos like 
the fact that only women may search or talk to the local women the officer in charge 
(OIC) of the training module intervened.  He told all of the cadets, “It is nice when I can 
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be culturally sensitive and get the job done without offending anyone, but I will be 
damned if their culture is going to stand in the way of me completing my mission.”  This 
statement highlighted the divergence between learning cultural awareness and practicing 
cultural awareness and points to a largely unacknowledged conceptual difference in the 
military between “cultural awareness” and “cultural competency.”  
For the U.S. Army the term “obstacle” means two different things.  First, foreign 
cultures, like a minefield or barbed wire entanglement, have to be successfully negotiated 
in order to accomplish a given mission.  From a military standpoint, cultural knowledge 
can both help U.S. Soldiers and civilians on the battlefield and, in its absence, harm them.  
An understanding of an adversary‟s culture can serve as a defensive measure that helps 
protect American assets while ignorance can become a dangerous roadblock to mission 
completion and the preservation of human life.  This is a concept that is reinforced during 
the ten-day field exercise at LDAC.  Research has revealed that Ball State cadets, when 
asked to describe the cultural awareness training at LDAC and the application of that 
knowledge during the FTX, tended to describe culture as an intangible force that could, 
and did, often interfere with the completion of the mission.  At the heart of this notion 
were the “language barrier” and the inability to use all members of the squad to 
accomplish the mission, specifically the females who were marginalized in the culture of 
the “host nation” and subsequently devalued in particular phases of the military 
operation.  Coincidentally, females faced similar challenges in the Army culture practiced 
at LDAC.  Second, the Army by itself is ill prepared to academically decipher the 
intricacies and interconnectedness of numerous culture groups within notional and 
arbitrary borders.  In order to do this successfully they must solicit help from 
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anthropologists who are both willing to aid the Department of Defense (DoD) and these 
can risk professional censorship from the American Anthropological Association (AAA).   
The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a Pentagon-sponsored project that uses 
social scientists, linguists, and regional experts to build a collective pool of knowledge to 
inform U.S. policies and procedures that affect the areas in which they operate.  Human 
Terrain Teams (HTT), typically composed of five civilians, are seen as the principle 
mechanism for gathering the cultural knowledge that will support military decision 
makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Beyerstein, 2007).  Though this 
topic is hotly debated within the anthropology community one of the goals of this is 
research is to explore alternatives for instilling cultural competency in Soldiers rather 
than finding new methods of data collection.  Cultural literacy and adaptability are 
absolutely necessary skills for the senior leadership that design and order missions.  
However, this research is primarily concerned with how the Soldiers in the field, 
especially those who will soon become junior officers, respond to cultural difference.  
Cultural obstacles are not a concept that only applies to the military personnel 
deployed to a foreign environment.  It also encompasses the effective utilization of 
available cultural information that pertains to all aspects of a military operation.  The 
divide between the discipline of anthropology and the military represents a most 
formidable challenge to the military having access to relevant, appropriate cultural 
information.  Seemingly contrary paradigms and organizational agendas treat cultural 
knowledge as an intellectual commodity to be controlled and it is the Soldiers and young 
officers on the ground that can suffer for it. 
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 In addition to the impact of Army culture training on ROTC cadets I will 
investigate the source of the training materials, specifically, the texts, experiences, 
people, etc. used to construct the knowledge base for the classes that were taught at 
LDAC.  I will also explore the connection between this inquiry and the future of ROTC 
culture and culture training at LDAC and in the universities.  In order to fully understand 
the issues that surround applied cultural competency in a military context, and the 
opposition to efforts like these from members of the anthropology community, it is 
imperative that I also look at the history of this relationship.  To this end, I will discuss 
relevant literature, key arguments from both sides, and the official stance of the AAA. 
 This research rests on four assumptions.  First, LDAC will be the location for the 
most widespread and focused culture training inside a Contemporary Operating 
Environment (COE) that most ROTC cadets will be exposed to prior to becoming an 
Army officer.  Second, the U.S. Army and ROTC will continue to teach cultural 
awareness to cadets, with or without the sanctioned assistance of the anthropology 
community.  Third, the Army, and the government as a whole, will suffer without 
sustained involvement from anthropologists.  The mistakes that reflect a lack of cultural 
knowledge made by military officials are likely to be many and some of them will 
undoubtedly have long-term consequences.  The final assumption is that there will most 
likely always be a rift between anthropology and military policy, one that can only grow 
wider in the absence of a shared dialogue. 
 My academic goal is to provide research that has potential for highlighting 
balanced, multidisciplinary solutions that will add to, and enrich, an extensive body of 
knowledge in the social sciences.  My professional goal is that this research will explore 
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new dimensions in cultural competency that can be applied to Army training, improve 
fundamental knowledge of both American and foreign cultures, and ultimately lead to 
hopefully more peaceful outcomes to conflict.  My personal goal is that by learning how 
other people understand culture in a military framework I will be able to learn more about 
myself, teach others what I know, and begin unraveling some fundamental questions and 
issues regarding cultural awareness and the military. 
 
Significance 
 The reasons why soldiers understand, or do not understand, culture as an 
important mechanism is because this reflects the difficulties of transitioning from 
conventional warfare definitions of mission to peacetime strategies.  This is evident in 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) as well as humanitarian aide, and other 
missions where force is undesirable because they require a significant commitment to 
cultural understanding and long-term partnership.  A cooperation and dedication to 
culture as a means to better understand the Other is not just a symbolic gesture but can 
lead to peaceful solutions to civilian disagreement or hardship.   
 Initiating a robust cultural education program at the college and university level is 
the key to building sustainable cultural competency in ROTC cadets and future officers 
of the U.S. Army.  When they graduate they will enter military service on active-duty, in 
the organized reserves, or in the National Guard.  Nearly 5000 cadets trained at LDAC in 
the summer of 2007 where many of them saw culture training for the first and maybe last 
time before they deploy to culturally diverse locations like Central Asia, the Middle East, 
or the Horn of Africa.  Gaining a better perspective of the culture that informs the 
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perceptions and understanding of foreign cultures is critical to designing and 
implementing a more adequate military training system. 
The research into how knowledge of foreign cultures is transmitted in a military 
setting is important for several reasons.  For the discipline of anthropology this 
knowledge informs practical application, adaptive research strategies and paradigmatic 
thought.  For the Army results could affect the course of future training initiatives for 
both ROTC programs and deploying Soldiers in need of more in-depth cultural 
education.  Understanding culture is not only fundamental to conflict resolutions, but it is 
also a more constructive way to generate and implement a variety of alternatives.  I find 
the absence of an anthropologically disciplinary presence to be a serious omission on the 
part of academia considering the fact that hundreds of thousands of U.S. military and 
government personnel have been sent overseas, where the need for cultural interaction is 
so important and the potential for misunderstanding bears grave consequences for 
everybody involved. 
This project will provide a base for future research work.  Learning how culture is 
understood is a never-ending process whose value I hope to teach to my children, future 
students, and Soldiers of all rank.  It is my goal here to synthesize the military and 
academic agendas regarding the teaching and use of culture into a relevant, and above all 
else, practical body of knowledge that will help bridge the gaps in the literature and serve 
as an invitation for an open dialog between anthropologists, military members of all rank, 
and policy makers. 
 
Context  
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 As previously noted, this research is situated within multiple contexts; all of 
which must be kept in mind here.  Though being born in the United States is not a 
requirement for participating in the ROTC program all but one cadet at Ball State was 
born within its boundaries, with only a few coming from places outside of Indiana. Ball 
State cadets are primarily white, male, and middle-class with an average age of 23.   
There are three overlaying contextual influences that impact the ROTC cadet- 
American culture, military culture (specifically Army), and university culture.  It is the 
combination of these three factors that help define ROTC culture as a separate entity 
within American society.  This research will highlight specific elements of cadet 
interviews that offer a better understanding of this cultural matrix.  Certain aspects of 
American culture that might influence the outcome of a mission and whether or not a 
cadet was entering active-duty or the National Guard are points that will be stressed here.  
When asked to describe what parts of American culture would come into play in a 
village in Afghanistan cadets typically responded that notions of independence, 
capitalism, and a preference for technology (meaning gadgets) would be very different 
from what Afghans might know.  However, in saying this nearly every cadet stressed that 
the most important thing was how the Soldier could learn to see past the differences, 
identify the similarities, and work on building relationships with the local people.  A 21-
year old female criminal justice major told me 
 
You can‟t take what we value and compare it to another country just because there are 
so many other attributes surrounding it…there are a lot of different things and you 
cannot assume that it is the same and other countries think it is the same. 
 
While another cadet, an accounting major said 
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I think building relationships with the people there will be more valuable…  I think if I 
deploy one of my goals will be to make those relationships with the people and let them 
know that the American Soldiers are there for a reason, for a purpose, and we‟re there 
to help them. 
 
These statements, and others like them, underscore how vital to Ball State cadets see 
Army cultural awareness training, specifically, in relation to critical thinking.   Even 
though by all accounts, including my own personal experience with ROTC cultural 
awareness training, culture is ultimately presented as an obstacle to be overcome on the 
way to mission completion.  Nevertheless, Ball State cadets demonstrate they can reason 
beyond the available training.  In the absence of better education this will prove 
especially helpful. 
 Aside from choosing what branch of the Army to serve in the choice of going on 
active-duty, into the National Guard or the organized reserves is probably the next 
biggest career decision a cadet can make.  If a cadet is accepted as an active-duty officer 
this will be his or her job twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, food and housing 
expenses paid.  A cadet who enters the National Guard or Reserve Component drills one 
weekend a month and two weeks a year but must find a civilian job to meet all of their 
needs.  One National Guard cadet summed up training for the separate organizations, 
saying 
 
As far as a difference, obviously the active-duty guys are doing it 30 days a month.  
They‟re just training non-stop and they can focus more on that.  And the difficulties that 
the National Guard and Army Reserve run into is you only have two days a month to 
train and you really want to fit in as much as you in those two days.  I think that is the 
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biggest difficulty, trying to keep ups will all the tasks that need to be completed when 
you‟ve only got two days to do it. 
 
Another cadet had different concerns.  She told me that as a National Guard officer 
 
You‟re doing your job and you have one weekend a month but you are still putting in 
many hours outside of that one weekend a month.  But you also have a regular job and 
you have a home that you need to take care of and all of these things where in active-
duty everything is taken care of for you…  You don‟t have to deal with a second job.  
You really don‟t have to take care of doctor bills and insurance and figuring out how to 
coordinate all of these things.  As for myself, as a National Guard cadet and soon-to-be 
National Guard officer, I will have to balance a lot…  You have to balance your work 
with the Army and you have to prioritize and you have to think about what you have to 
do, not just in the Army, but [also] in life on a daily basis. 
 
Though there are obvious differences between active-duty and National Guard officers 
the most important factor that impacts this study is the mindset of the cadet who knows 
which organization they will be going to.  The cadet that is going active does not receive 
his branch assignment until mid-November and usually does not know what unit he or 
she will be going to until April of the year they graduate.  On the hand, the National 
Guard cadet almost always knows which branch they will be going to as soon as they 
request it.  This is because assignments are made at the state level and the Professor of 
Military Science (PMS) works with the decision makers to get the cadet the branch they 
want.  The cadets also know what unit they will be going to because they are currently 
serving in it or because they had made arrangements with another unit in advance of their 
branch selection.  The biggest difference, however, is that National Guard cadets must 
make finding a civilian job a priority; as well as finding a home, insurance etc.  This 
typically translates into less time for ROTC during the senior year.  This is not to say that 
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MS IV cadets do not care about the underclassmen or do not do everything that is asked 
of them.  Nor does it mean that cadets going into active-duty are anymore dedicated, it 
just means that their priorities have understandably shifted in another direction. 
 Though I have identified at least four separate contexts that will affect both the 
analysis and conclusion of this research one context that I have not mentioned yet is that 
of a nation at war.  The war on terrorism has impacted people and cultures worldwide; 
none more so than the men and women who not only prepare for war, but also those who 
prepare to lead Americans Soldiers into it.  The students who stay with the ROTC 
program and earn commissions as officers in the U.S. Army are well aware of the fact 
that they will be called upon to serve their country and that it is only a matter of time.  
The ROTC program at Ball State, like other Army training environments, is a place that 
fosters bravado and adventurism, real or imagined.  I have never once heard a cadet say 
that they would not deploy in a minute or that they were scared.  There may be 
grumblings about troop call-ups but they are talked about with a sense of inevitability.  
Most of the cadets I spoke with are idealistic and they believe that they can make a 
difference in some way, however small it may be.  These are the cadets that will deploy 
to foreign lands, who listen carefully when instructors discuss tactics and first-aid on the 
battlefield, who pick the brains of those who have been to places like Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and who are always trying to find a better way to complete the mission.   
 
Bias 
I am a 32-year old white, middle-class male who was born and raised in the Flint, 
Michigan area and this research reflects all of the biases inherent in these facts. I 
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graduated with a baccalaureate degree in anthropology from the University of Michigan- 
Flint in 2001 and joined the active-duty Army as a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Specialist in 2003.  After completing all necessary training I deployed to Afghanistan in 
March 2005 and remained there for nine months.  Upon my return I was promoted to the 
rank of Sergeant and was the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of various 
teams prior to my assignment as a ROTC cadet and subsequent arrival at Ball State 
University. 
The biggest influence on this research is the fact that I have active-duty 
experience in the Army.  However, because the Ball State ROTC program uniformly 
treats every cadet like they have no prior knowledge of Army practices and procedures 
the affect that prior service had on my training was negligible.  On the other hand, I was 
able to gain additional insight from the training and compare that with the Army schools 
and training I had previously received, including my deployment.  This insight has 
allowed me to more easily recognize the system of symbols and meanings common to a 
military framework and apply these insights to ROTC cultural awareness training at 
LDAC in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
“I would say that I would rather not utilize the media whenever possible just because 
you always hear that stipulation where the media is not portraying it the way it actually 
is.  The thing I like is, with a lot of soldiers in today‟s Army, they‟ve been deployed, 
they‟ve been overseas and for me especially- get the information from them.  Talk to 
the guys who just got back from deployment and listen to their stories and what they 
went through, what they saw and what they liked and use those stories.  I trust those 
stories more than I would any form of media.” – Ball State cadet talking about the best 
sources for information about other cultures 
 
 
Population Sample and Techniques 
 
 This research uses ethnographic methods to observe, record, and analyze various 
cultural aspects associated with the Ball State University ROTC program, including a 
specific focus on the cultural awareness training that occurred on campus and at the 
Leadership Development Assessment Course (LDAC) in 2007.  I decided to study the 
BSU ROTC cadets for two reasons.  First, because I too am a Ball State cadet and I felt 
that I was ideally situated to study this organization and interpret its system of symbols 
and meanings.  Secondly, Warrior Forge 2007 (LDAC) represented the first time that all 
ROTC cadets commissioning in the summer of 2007 and in 2008 would receive the same 
cultural awareness training.  This is significant because it impacted nearly 5000 thousand 
future officers and for many of them, it could be their only opportunity to practice 
cultural competency inside a simulated contemporary operating environment (COE) 
before deploying to locations around the world.  Studying ROTC cadets at Ball State 
allowed me the opportunity to conceptualize a theoretical framework for cultural 
understanding that must operate in the high-stress situations of a foreign, conflict-
oriented environment. 
The research sample included ten key informants and approximately 30 other 
informants. The primary sample consisted of ten MS IV cadets, seven males and three 
females, from the BSU ROTC program while the secondary sample was made up of 
ROTC underclassmen.  The majority of the observations took place on Ball State‟s 
campus and during the field training exercise (FTX) portion of LDAC (Fort Lewis, WA).  
The cadets came from a variety of backgrounds.  This ranged from never having attended 
Army training outside BSU ROTC to having multiple years of active-duty experience and 
wartime service in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The ten cadets chosen as primary informants 
came from a total pool of 12 with two not available for interviews.  These cadets have 
been assigned to nine different branches (from a total of 16) of the Army; a decision 
based on individual preference and needs of the Army, and all ten cadets attended 
different LDAC training regiments (from a total of 13) and thus have unique experiences 
not shared by the others.  
To look at how ROTC cadets understand culture, I chose to measure demographic 
data, past experiences with foreign cultures, and deployment history.  The demography of 
my informants, including; age, prior service, academic major, and family members with 
past or present service, were important factors because they established a baseline for the 
construction of cultural knowledge, especially regarding the military.  This included what 
the individual learned prior to joining the ROTC program, what the cadet learned as a 
result of formal military education, and what the individual learned as a ROTC cadet but 
was not a part of the curriculum.  A cadet‟s past experiences with cultural difference, not 
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including deployment, is another key component in the conceptual framework that, when 
shared with others, becomes a part of a team philosophy.  Teamwork as an approach to 
learning and problem solving is a concept that is introduced during Basic Training and 
reinforced throughout a Soldier‟s Army career.  This is especially significant because this 
approach is also reflected in ROTC training and has not previously been considered an 
important factor in cultural education. 
This research project incorporates data from five documents (USACC, TRADOC) 
utilized by the Army for cultural awareness training.  These are the only verified material 
that could be located.  A review of these training documents allowed for a better 
understanding of what was intended for cadet culture training versus what it actually 
meant to them.  This led to a clearer understanding of the term “culture.” 
 
Survey Instrument and Pre-test 
 During this research project participant observation was supported by semi-
structured interviews designed to fill in gaps in the researcher‟s knowledge of the cadet 
cultural education process.  The line of questioning was broken into four components 
intended to solicit more information about ROTC culture and culture training.  These 
categories consisted of demographic data and also included general questions about 
culture, training, and culture awareness training.  The questions themselves were not 
intended to be exhaustive, but were rather a technique to promote conversation and story 
telling about LDAC.  Interviews typically averaged one and one half hours in length with 
the longest exceeding three hours. 
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 The initial line of questioning was vetted through one cadet who did not 
participate in the final interview process.  As well, all the other interviews ended with 
two questions, “What should I have asked but did not?” and “Is there anything else you 
would like to tell me about ROTC culture, cultural awareness training, or culture in 
general?”  Their responses, if especially relevant to the research, would then be added to 
the list of questions asked other cadets. 
 
Limitations 
The biggest limitation to this research is that cadet responses were retrospective.  
However, interviews appeared to be unaffected by the intervening months between cadet 
experiences at LDAC and their conversations with me, which took part no more than six 
months after LDAC.  When one cadet had trouble remembering specific instances of 
cultural awareness training at LDAC I asked her if it had been too long and she said that 
this was not the case, a statement that was supported by her highly detailed descriptions 
of other training elements.  Instead, she told me the reason she could not remember 
culture training was because she was never chosen to participate in the role-playing 
scenarios.  This is something to be discussed further here. 
Though both the Air Force and Navy have ROTC programs at colleges and 
universities throughout the country this study is focused on Army ROTC and more 
specifically, Ball State Army ROTC.  The Ball State ROTC program is, by comparison 
with other university ROTC programs, small, averaging approximately 75 cadets on 
campus.  In 2006 and again in 2007 BSU ROTC added the satellite ROTC programs at 
Indiana Wesleyan and Indiana-Purdue Fort Wayne respectively.  These cadets are not on 
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campus but do participate in all training exercises held on the weekends.  One cadet from 
each satellite campus was interviewed for this research because they had participated in 
all BSU ROTC functions prior to the establishment of the new local programs. 
The cultural awareness training at LDAC in 2007 may be the only opportunity for 
newly commissioned officers to practice cultural competency prior to deployment.  
However, this research did not look at the two training schools new Second Lieutenants 
must attend after graduating from college or university.  Basic Officer Leader Course 
(BOLC) II is a field leadership lab that focuses on infantry tactics and is six weeks long.  
BOLC III is a branch-specific school approximately eight to twenty weeks long (branch 
dependant) that teaches the new officer the basic skill set of his or her career field.  
However, today cultural awareness training was not a scheduled event at any of these 
schools though this is subject to change at any time. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
It is not too early to call for a Renaissance in Strategic Education- for military and 
civilians alike.  In diplomacy as in academe and in the media, there is unquestionably a 
need for greater strategic literacy, and the military can play a constructive role; but by 
the same token, the military will have to free itself from the Clausewitzian straitjacket if 
it ever wants to make a significant contribution to grand strategy…If ours is the age of 
the “strategic corporal (Krulak), NCOs and junior officers will need a different kind of 
“situational awareness” than in the past- and that, in itself, will call for a radical 
transformation of professional military education (PME).  -Tony Corn (Clausewitz in 
Wonderland, 2006) 
 
 
Field Training 
 
Catherine Lutz‟s Homefront: A Military City and the American 20th Century (Beacon 
Press 2001) is primarily concerned with the establishment of Fort Bragg and its effect on 
the city of Fayetteville, NC and the surrounding community (Cumberland County).  Since 
this book is set in the late 20
th
 century it is not surprising to find the majority of the study 
revolves around World War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam.  There is little mention of the 
Korean War.   
Though there is also very little here that contributes to the understanding of the 
organization of modern ROTC programs, Lutz‟s chapter entitled Simulating War at 
Home: Counterinsurgencies, Foreign and Domestic (1948-1963) (pp. 87-130) is 
important because it highlights the training exercises that prepare Soldiers for war; a 
concept common in military education.  Today, war games are more commonly known as 
Field Training Exercises (FTX) and Situational Training Exercises (STX).  The focus of 
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this training is usually the strategy, tactics, and techniques necessary for successful 
mission completion within the contemporary operating environment (COE).  However, 
now as then, a significant portion of these exercises are devoted to poorly understood 
human variables; insurgents, counterinsurgents, and civilians on the battlefield (COB).  
These of course are factors related to culture and cultural awareness. 
A common thread to war games past and present is that in these games the Army is 
training for unknowable future based on sociological, economic, and political realities as 
defined by the United States at that time. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the U.S. 
military centered their war-gaming on the threat of nuclear strike, efforts that increased 
after the Soviet Union first detonated atomic weapons in 1953.  In 1954 the Army 
commenced a large-scale training operation called Exercise Flash Burn that involved 
sixty-four thousand men at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (2001:88).  Though the main goal 
appeared to demonstrate that the Army could still play a vital role in a nuclear age that 
appeared to favor a larger Navy and Air Force.  This exercise also focused on small unit 
tactics and the role of the Army in civilian affairs, especially regarding infrastructure 
sustainment and mortuary services.  Ultimately, the proliferation of nuclear arms and the 
inescapable conclusion of mutually assured destruction led the U.S. to redefine its 
responsibility on the world stage.  With the aid of National Security Council directives 
U.S. strategy soon shifted towards a policy of carefully guarded secrets, deterrence, and a 
global policing of technologies that could lead to nuclear capabilities among other 
nations.  The perceived threat embodied by the Soviets and the spread of communism 
brought about the Cold War and with it.  America‟s introduction to the counterinsurgency 
warfare would characterize the remainder of the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century warfare. 
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Counterinsurgency training has necessarily changed with the complexity of 
America‟s involvement in foreign affairs.  The advent of this (then) new mode of 
warfare, including the accompanying training system, required more than ever, a reliable, 
unbiased source of cultural knowledge.  Though it is debatable that an objective data pool 
will ever inform military training, several trends for enhancing the robustness of field 
exercises appear to have been established during this time.  This included, most notably, 
the practice of involving all the different types of units (e.g. infantry, logistics, personnel 
services) that would be working together during an operation (a concept that has been 
redefined today under the Army‟s modular system), utilizing citizen-volunteers in the 
vicinity of the post for role playing duties, and making use of personal experiences 
relevant to the training scenario. 
Perhaps the most important of these concepts applied to Warrior Forge 2007, the 
field portion of the Leadership Development Assessment Course (LDAC), was of 
personal experience.  The majority of cadre members and evaluators, also known as 
“TACS,” had been deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and their 
counseling and advice were meant to ground the cadet and his or her actions in the 
realities of this kind of warfare.  The same was true for the role players, most of whom 
were infantryman from the 2
nd
 Infantry Division who had served multiple combat tours. 
Where a TAC was likely to explain the significance of a gesture or misstep in the overall 
success or failure of the mission role players could reward a cadet squad leader for 
particular conduct by helping him or her safely complete the mission or punish them by 
“killing” members of his or her team. 
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One of the earliest known mass field exercises, conducted at Fort Bragg, was 
codenamed Swift Strike III (1954) and involved 100,000 men of the 82
nd
 Airborne 
Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), combat service support personnel, and an 
unknown number of participants from the surrounding counties (2001:94-96).  Swift 
Strike III was modeled after an imagined culture of a communist Dominican Republic or 
Indo-China, cultures and regions that were mostly inaccessible to war game designers.  
Throughout the month long exercise the less than authoritative sources of data, those that 
informed military strategic thinking, and by extension the American public, resulted in a 
general confusion about whether the communist enemy was foreign or domestic.  There 
was similar confusion about whether the enemy‟s targets were within the U.S. or outside.  
This, as Lutz suggests, “illustrates how the Cold War was connected to the idea of play 
and imagination on the one hand, and to the deadly serious business of preserving and 
contesting the racial caste system [of the other]” (96).  The failure to properly identify 
and portray an enemy seen as a scourge upon the world and a threat to democracy 
everywhere reflected the uncertainty that gripped the country.  This meant that the 
meanings attached to this exercise rested more on fear and ideology than more reliable 
forms of knowledge about America‟s opponents of the time. 
Although most of the key elements for a successful counterinsurgency war game 
were present during early simulations like Swift Strike III, these exercises failed to 
adequately understand and incorporate the cultural component needed to make sense of 
the contexts that informed all the actors.  According to John A. Nagl, author of the 
forward to the University of Chicago Press edition of the Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (2007), 
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The sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the 
Army was unprepared to fight it.    The American Army of 2003 was organized, 
designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army; indeed, it had no 
peer in that arena.  It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it 
could not hope to the defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who 
therefore chose to wage war against America from the shadows (2007:xiii). 
 
However true this may be, according to Douglas C. Waller‟s The Commandos (Dell 
Publishing, 1994) the Army made immense strides in the 1960s when newly funded 
Special Operations Forces preparing for deployments to Vietnam were trained at Fort 
Bragg.  SOF, composed of Special Forces (SF), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and 
Civil Affairs (CA) (the Rangers and 160
th
 Special Operations Aviation Regiment [SOAR] 
were later added), these units specialized in unconventional warfare and 
counterinsurgency.  Their missions depend on their ability to adapt, and work with, a 
multitude of foreign cultures.  Their training is similar to some previous units in that 
planners make extensive use of locals as role players.  These men and women portray 
civilians, partisans, insurgents, friendly and hostile guerilla forces, and other people 
encountered during the course of a SOF operation.  Locals take much pride in their work 
and feel personally responsible for providing Special Forces with tough, realistic training.  
In fact, the same families have been playing various roles for so long that they are passed 
down to other members of the family generation after generation.  Though conventional 
U.S. forces do not usually undergo the same prolonged level of involvement because of 
their size and mission, the thorough, realistic, in-depth nature of training employed by the 
Special Forces is the gold standard all units strive for, including Reserve Officers‟ 
Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus and at LDAC. 
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The “field” is the ultimate test of a Soldiers ability to effectively carry out his or her 
mission (some MOS‟s do not regularly participate in field training exercises because of 
the nature of their job, however every unit is required to maintain individual proficiency 
at core tasks such as first aid and marksmanship.).  Both Basic Combat Training (BCT) 
and (most) Advanced Individual Training (AIT) finish with a week long FTX where the 
Soldier must apply their newly acquired skills in simulated combat conditions.  Indeed, 
many MOS‟s have multiple FTX‟s, STX‟s, and CFTX‟s throughout their training cycle.  
ROTC is no different.  Most schools, including Ball State, conduct one or more of each 
during the academic year and all cadets in their third year of ROTC regardless of school, 
are required to attend LDAC.  LDAC, much like BCT, focuses on basic Soldier skills and 
concludes with a rigorous FTX, in this case 10 days of field training. 
In addition to the warrior skills (shooting, moving, communicating) ROTC and the 
Army Initial Entry Training (IET) (comprised of BCT and AIT) programs teach students 
the same core group of fundamentals - Army culture and values, history, customs and 
courtesies.  ROTC is also similar to other military training in that field exercises are 
usually preceded by classroom instruction; however, ROTC spends significantly more 
time doing this.  But perhaps the most important difference between IET and ROTC lies 
in the fact that, unlike new Soldiers who spend nine weeks or more being fully immersed 
in Army culture, cadets rarely spend more than a couple of hours per day in uniform and 
not more than a few scattered weekends throughout the academic year in the field prior to 
going to LDAC.  The one exception to this, especially at Ball State, is for those cadets 
who are simultaneously serving in the National Guard (referred to as SMP [Simultaneous 
Membership Program] cadets).  These cadets are still required to drill one weekend a 
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month (if there is no ROTC training scheduled for that month) but their training 
experiences vary from nominal support staff to shadowing other officers to platoon 
leaders to little or no participation at all.  The only apparently universal experience these 
cadets all share is that of the ROTC program.  
 
ROTC Context 
There can be a disjunction between the goals of the Army and ROTC. Michael S. 
Neiberg‟s book, Making Citizen Soldiers:  ROTC and the Ideology of American Military 
Service (Harvard University Press, 2000), describes the historic divide between Army 
and ROTC and characterizes ROTC as a unique organization.  Neiberg examines the 
evolution of the military and its relationship with higher education using ROTC as a lens.  
To this end Neiberg states, “understanding ROTC, then, has importance beyond 
understanding officer procurement and training” (2000:6) and I could not agree more.  
The author‟s research and mine treat ROTC as a subculture of both the military and the 
university, situated within the context of American culture; however, significant 
differences occur in the scope of each respective study.  This research is limited to a 
single branch of service and a single ROTC unit and it focuses on the cadets themselves 
and the meanings they ascribe to the unit and certain training events.  Neiberg looks at a 
dozen or more universities across every branch of service.  He focuses less on the cadets‟ 
experience and more on the military and academic bureaucracies that helped inform 
ROTC policies and shaped the modern program.  Neiberg‟s work nevertheless makes an 
important contribution to this study in that it provides a historical context for the attitudes 
and institutions that define ROTC today.  
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 Two pieces of legislature were instrumental in the establishment of the Reserve 
Officers‟ Training Corps.  The Morrill Act of 1862 proposed the sale of 30,000 acres of 
public land in order to establish public colleges, all of which would be required to offer 
courses in military tactics.  The National Defense Act of 1916 created the ROTC as a 
means to standardize that military training and to help professionalize the officer‟s corps 
serving in the organized reserves and National Guard.  While these two measures directly 
benefited the strategic aims of the military, especially America‟s involvement in World 
War I, they also met the approval of universities who eagerly sought ROTC programs as 
part of their patriotic duty.  Indeed, for many years after the initial allocation of ROTC 
programs there was a waiting list several years long for colleges that wanted to 
demonstrate their commitment to national defense.   
ROTC also had the support of the American people and the National Guard (who 
would received the majority of ROTC trained officers), because the result would be a 
body of officers educated close to home and possessing local values.  This was in contrast 
to the service academies (West Point and Annapolis) whose future officers were isolated 
in a closed military environment and (feared to be) prone to military elitism, which could 
threaten civil liberties and American society.  Distrust of professional officers and 
standing armies, both of whom were thought to work in the interest of state over that of 
the people, reflects the history of the American Revolution and British colonialism of that 
time.  Neiberg argues at the heart of ROTC development and growth was the fact that, 
“ROTC played a critical role in fulfilling a powerful American belief:  that the military 
must be subservient to civilian interests for it to truly represent and defend the interests of 
the society it serves” (2000:13), a position that dates back to the Moderate Whig tradition 
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(18
th
 century).  The belief that the men and women who train to become officers should 
be citizens first and soldiers second coupled with the “preference for nonprofessional 
officers [that] had become a consistent feature of American culture” (2000:22) set a 
foundation upon which ROTC rests today. 
 Though ROTC embodied established cultural values that characterized nearly 250 
years of American military history, it still had to prove flexible enough to meet the 
demands of both the armed services and the changing socio-political climate of college 
campuses around the country.  The program has gone through fluctuations in enrollment, 
curriculum changes prompted by the Department of Defense (DoD) and university 
policy, and the turmoil of the 1960s and 70s.  However, at its core ROTC has been able 
to adapt to cultural trends and correct past mistakes, albeit slower than many may have 
desired.  
The Vitalization Act of 1964 allocated more scholarships for cadets in order to 
address dwindling enrollment, but this act did not change some of “the most 
objectionable features of ROTC…[the emphasis on] military ceremony and drill as a 
means of achieving order and discipline” (2000:111).  The “high visibility” profile of 
ROTC units became especially problematic during the period of escalating anti-Vietnam 
War sentiment.  ROTC cadre was able to mitigate this because it chose to avoid potential 
conflict wherever they arose. Following the Vietnam War ROTC drastically improved its 
recruitment and enrollment of females and African Americans and improved the quality 
of its instructors and curriculum, bringing the program more in line with university 
academic standards.  But perhaps the most significant transformation involved neither 
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academic principle nor administrative oversight; it was, in fact, a policy change intended 
to produce dynamic leaders and manager‟s not just technologically proficient officers. 
To achieve this the officer education process was refined shortly after World War 
II, and has been modified after every major conflict since then.  During his opening 
address at the Contemporary Military Forum on leader development at the Association of 
the United States Army‟s Annual Meeting and Exposition (9 Oct 2007) Lt. Gen. William 
Caldwell IV, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, 
KS, argued that “‟learning how to think‟ not „what to think‟ is a change sweeping through 
intermediate officer education with implications in educating junior officers, warrant 
officers, noncommissioned officers and civilians” (Training programs changing focus to 
develop adaptive leaders, AUSA News, 1 Dec 2007).  Maj. Gen. W. Montague Winfield, 
commanding general of U.S. Army Cadet Command supported this saying, “the common 
Basic Officer Leadership Course I [BOLC I] for ROTC students is „focused on creating 
agile and adaptive leaders.‟”  These statements, combined with the teachings of ROTC 
instructors (at Ball State and LDAC) and the attitudes of the cadets I spoke with suggest a 
shared unity of purpose on this point up and down the Army chain of command.  The 
need for instruction of this kind no doubt has become more evident given the current state 
of affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The primary mission for Army ROTC is to train leaders to earn their commissions 
as Second Lieutenants.  David Axe‟s book, Army 101:  Inside ROTC in a Time of War 
(University of South Carolina Press, 2007), looks at the University of South Carolina 
Gamecock Battalion and describes some of the training events used to develop the critical 
leadership skills the Army officer corps values.  Axe discusses how the FTX helps hone 
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combat skills and troop leading procedures and touches on the value of land navigation 
and physical training (PT).  Unlike other literature concerning ROTC Army 101 focuses 
on the stories and history of various individuals, including their motivations, relationships 
with other cadets and cadre, as well as their fears.  Axe‟s interviews with students also 
uncover some key symbols and institutions- military schools (Airborne, Air Assault, 
Ranger, LDAC), scholarships, “war stories,” branching, commissioning, and drinking- 
that define and inform a cadet‟s life.  These symbols and their associated meaning are 
part of a culture that is neither fully Army nor fully college informed, but rather is a 
combination of both situated within the larger context of American culture.  Though 
Army ROTC cadets can represent the best of the cultures they are socialized in, they can 
just as often portray a grittier side of Americanism.  Axe captures this sentiment best 
when he says, “inasmuch as American popular culture is drunken, violent, narcissistic, 
and profane, the U.S. Army is, too” (2007:31) and so too, by extension, are the ROTC 
cadets at Ball State University. 
 
Army Culture 
 It goes without saying that there is a large difference between playing Army in 
ROTC and being Army in the National Guard, organized reserves, or on active-duty.  As 
mentioned earlier, each branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force) has a distinct culture, 
which in turn fosters unique subcultures that persist down to the squad level.  This is 
discussed in Beitz and Hook‟s Internet article, The Culture of Military Organizations: A 
Participant-Observer Case Study of Cultural Diversity 
(http://www.pamij.com/beitz.html, accessed 29 Oct 2007).  Beitz and Hook argue that 
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“cultures appear to be a function of two principal factors: the characteristics and style of 
the senior leader, and the particular setting of the organization” (1).  Under the Army‟s 
normal operating structure of the Army both of these factors are subject to change, but 
none more so than that of senior leader.  To illustrate this point the authors look at one 
particular unit under the command of three separate generals.  Despite the fact the unit 
itself retained the same level of overall effectiveness, the culture and character were 
much altered by the leadership style of each commanding general (CG).  The authors 
contend that this organization, and others like it, maintain their cohesion through 
“cultural anchors;” rites and rituals, heroes, and through cultural networks (6).    
ROTC units have many of the same rites and rituals that regular Army units have.  
There is a hierarchy and rank structure and cadets are held to most of the same standards 
that govern the rest of the Army, especially with regards to the wearing of the uniform 
(see AR 670-1).  Cadets go to PT, perform drill and ceremony, and are given awards for 
their achievements.  Though no ROTC program has ever asked one of its students to 
charge a hill in the name of their university they do have folk heroes who inspire cadets 
through word or deed (e.g. a consistently high PT score).   
However, perhaps the most salient dimension of ROTC culture (in this case BSU 
ROTC) is its cultural network.  This network is characterized by two factors.  The first is 
the experiences of the cadre who have served in different branches of the Army (e.g. 
Military Intelligence, Ordinance, Infantry, etc.) who have come together at different 
points in their careers (though it is typically at the end) to teach cadets.  They 
communicate Army traditions and standards top down to the cadets, but their own 
leadership styles often tend to have minimal effect on the local Ball State organization 
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due to the brevity of both their stay and that of the cadets there.  At best, a cadet can 
expect the commander and senior NCO to be in their respective positions no more than 
four years.  During my two years with the BSU ROTC program we lost one instructor, 
two senior NCOs, and the commander.   
The other factor in the cultural network is that it is driven from the bottom up and 
comes from the cadets themselves.  Its effect is also temporary as no cadet is there longer 
than four years and most are there for just two years.  Cadets bring their past military 
experiences (Army, Air Force, Marine, Navy; active-duty, National Guard, reserves; 
deployed, non-deployed; etc.) and, as students on campus, serve as a conduit for cultural 
trends and the ideology of their generation.  The idea that each generation brings its own 
culture, impacting the Army in ways not understood by older generations, is taken up in 
Wong‟s monograph, Generations Apart:  Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps 
(Publications & Production Office, 2000).  Though the research was meant to inform 
DoD officials of strategies to retain lieutenants and captains Wong raises an interesting 
point when he argues that young officers will leave the Army if their values and beliefs 
are too much at odds with those of senior leadership and policy makers.  This is 
important to keep in mind when one considers how cadets process information about 
foreign cultures (does culture mean the same thing to senior leaders as it does to junior 
officers?).  Wong‟s work supports this thesis‟ argument: to be successful culture training 
must be tailored to the culture of those who would use it. 
  
The Need for Anthropology 
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 The need for cultural expertise in the military has reached something like a crisis 
point.  However, viable solutions are hard to come by and tougher to put in effect.  In an 
article for the military trade journal Field Artillery entitled, Developing Cultural 
Understanding in Stability Operations: A Three-Step Process (2007), Lt. Col. Prisco R. 
Hernandez (ARNG) writes about the need for cultural understanding.  He argues that this 
is best achieved through a critical reading of history and culture, mastering language 
skills, and the practical application of skill based content in a “total immersion” 
environment.  I do not fault his assertion that the Soldier so trained “will be well on his 
way to cultural understanding” (2007:9) though I do disagree about his method. His 
suggestion that language skills and the practical application of cultural and linguistic 
knowledge has to be or is best performed in a total immersion environment is clearly an 
appeal to upper echelon bureaucrats and policy makers who have already invested in 
these kinds of environments.  Further, Lt. Col. Hernandez‟s statement, “knowledge of 
history and basic cultural understanding are, conceptually, the easiest to acquire” 
(2007:6) backed by his recommendation that the student must gain perspective by finding 
“the best books by prominent historians that offer contrasting views of the subject” 
[emphasis added] and “a translation of a good history written by a historian from that 
culture” [emphasis added] begs the question, what is best and good?  Because the reader 
does not know who the “student” is I will assume the author is referring to somebody 
who is well educated enough that he or she may be able to discern between best and 
good, especially in relation to a culture and history that they are unfamiliar with.  The 
“student” here is probably a senior officer, namely because the author refers to a 
schooling process that is no less than one year long and would allow the Soldier to 
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“operate with considerable independence from an interpreter and gain stature with 
leaders” (9), and because it was vetted by the Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC) and the Battle Command Training Center (BCTP), both prestigious schools for 
senior officers.  The part of Lt. Col. Hernandez‟s argument that most interests us here is 
that he believes a significant cultural shift in military thinking is necessary to meet the 
demands of the contemporary operating environment. 
 Lt. Col. Brett G. Lewis (U.S. Army) also recognizes the difficulty in developing 
cultural knowledge in Soldiers.  In a research project for the U.S. Army War College 
(USAWC) entitled, Developing Soldier Cultural Competency (2006), the author argues 
for widespread cultural education for all Soldiers regardless of rank or station.  Though 
he credits the Army for their attempts to address cultural knowledge, especially through 
online language programs (Rosetta Stone) and a variety of immersive training exercises, 
Lt. Col. Lewis criticizes the decentralized nature of culture awareness training.  He 
describes, “the effectiveness of current cultural training across the U.S. Army is mixed at 
best, providing Soldiers a „tourist‟ level of understanding which does not adequately 
prepare them to be culturally competent and effective” (2006:3).  Furthermore, he adds  
 
Cross-cultural training is not simply a briefing of general or anecdotal features of a 
specific culture.  While many Soldiers prefer country culture specific training to be 
reduced to a simple checklist, basic phrases, generalized demographic facts, within a 
visual presentation, cross-cultural training is [more] focused on learning about one‟s 
internal cultural biases than understanding the culture of others (2006:8). 
 
 Lt. Col. Lewis argues that Soldiers who understand how their cultural influences‟ 
impact their thoughts and actions will be more able and willing to recognize similar 
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processes in other people.  This is an important element in developing cultural 
competency and self-awareness, both of which can reduce stress and anxiety while 
deployed and enables effective communication across cultures.  The author argues that in 
order to achieve this goal “Soldiers need an institutionalized culture education program, 
which is critical in developing and maintaining cultural competency, to support 
expeditionary deployments in the future” (2006:11).  He sees the current professional 
military education (PME) system (which includes Basic Training and all Army schools), 
including commissioning sources like ROTC, as the “perfect framework to develop 
cultural competency across the force.”  Ultimately, his concept is sound though it does 
beg the questions, what will be taught and who will be teaching it?  To best answer these 
questions it is necessary to know something about the proposed target audience.  
 The road to cultural adaptability for military personnel is long and, as Lt. Col. 
Lewis suggests, may require not so much a new vehicle but a different path altogether.  
Not everybody can see the merits of such an approach, possibly because it would require 
at the very least, important and significant changes to existing doctrine.  A November 
2006 essay entitled, Military Cultural Awareness: From Anthropology to Application, 
written by John W. Jandora for Landpower Essay (An Institute of Land Warfare 
Publication) advocates, like so many recent articles, for improved cultural awareness 
inside the military.  He describes the components of a target (predominantly Arab) 
culture that impact operations and details how they need to be addressed in order to 
satisfy the requirements of commanders and leaders.  However, unlike other authors, 
Jandora gives his readers a list of “behavioral „dos and don‟ts‟” as “precautions to respect 
Islam” (2006:3).  Normative “cheat sheets” that treat Middle Eastern cultures as a single 
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culture of Islam (with few distinctions noted for the different sects) are not new; though, 
they are rarely linked to the future of cultural awareness training and education. It is 
unsurprising to find that the author follows this method for transmitting cultural 
knowledge to its logical conclusion when he recommends “reducing” culture down to a 
series of “special „products‟” that take the form of military handbooks and appendices to 
existing doctrine and field manuals (2006:6).  Furthermore, Jandora‟s presentation is 
essentially a normative list of “fundamental cultural differences” (2006:4) that reduces 
“American” and “Arab” culture to a set of overly simplified contrasting values.  The list 
looks like this: 
 
  American    Arab 
  Action-oriented    Word-oriented 
 
  Balanced in self-exertion  Bipolar in self-exertion 
 
  Casual interpretation of phenom. Atomistic interpretation of phenom. 
 
  Rationalist in explanation  Allegoric in explanation 
 
  Materialist outlook   Spiritualist outlook 
  (possessions matter)   (all belongs to God) 
 
  Women are liberated   Women are shielded 
 
  Public-good mindset   Clan-interest mindset 
 
  Openly debate significant issues Conceal issues (to “save face”) 
 
  Distinction between war   Interplay of war and negotiation 
  and negotiation  
 
  Shock effect is best combat method Stand-off is best combat method 
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Not only reductionistic exercises like this point to how little the military understands 
culture difference.  Efforts like this can also damage the already fragile dialogue that 
exists between social scientists and the military.  Further, the practice of reducing 
cultures to an “us versus them” lists is counterproductive to staff cultural understanding 
and adaptability because it can lead to stereotyped reaction to culturally diverse situations 
instead of proactive, critical thinking.  
 It is exactly this type of naive scholarship that worries Patrick Porter, author of 
the article Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War 
(Parameters, Summer 2007).  He characterizes work like Janadora‟s as presenting “an 
overly determinist view of the tangled relationship between war and culture…[that] 
paradoxically, while it aims to encourage greater sensitivity to the nuances that 
differentiate cultures, it actually encourages a crude view of ancient and fixed ways of 
war.  It risks replacing strategy with stereotypes” (2007:46).  Porter argues that the need 
to take a “cultural turn,” an anthropological approach to military operations, has been 
given strength by recent American failures.  This has led to debates over the value of 
universal principles of strategy, and represents perhaps “a wider backlash against the 
universalism of the Bush Administration‟s attempt to remake the world in America‟s 
image” (2007:48).  This cultural turn, as the Army understands it, is encapsulated in the 
Army‟s new counterinsurgency field manual, DoD policies and programs.  It can also be 
seen in some of the latest military history books.  Porter warns against the dangers of 
oversimplifying culture and thus seeing it as the root of, and solution to, conflicts around 
the world.  This is because culture is “historically remade and contested,” a fact not often 
apparently conveyed to government officials and senior military leadership. Even what 
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anthropologists provide policymakers appears to be cut out of the same cloth.  
Ultimately, “cultural determinism [of the kind Janadora advocates] sees what it wants to 
see in history, making facts fit a theory to confirm its urgent contemporary agenda” 
(2007:56). It is with great care and critical analysis that future research in culture related 
to the military must proceed.  What is required is a better understanding of culture, one 
that can be fomented throughout a Soldier‟s and officer‟s career and development.  
Understanding how new Soldiers and cadets think about culture is a better method of 
communicating meaningful knowledge because it takes into account how they acquire 
skills and knowledge in the Army, chiefly through teamwork and hands-on experience.  
  
Action 
 According to Gail McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans and 
DoD Senior Language Authority, in her keynote remarks at the 2007 Michigan World 
Language Association Conference (Lansing, MI) she talked about the Department of 
Defense‟s focus on the “development of regional and cultural capabilities.”  In light of 
the need for cultural illiteracy faced by deployed military personnel she adds, “it is our 
responsibility to ensure they have the appropriate language and cultural competencies to 
operate and survive in the global community…we are exercising this responsibility with a 
shift in strategy that elevates language and cultural proficiency…” This is the core 
concept of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (published in February 
2005), which encompassed the operational needs of the commander and planner and 
reviewed current doctrine and policies.  Additionally, in an effort to expand culture and 
language learning opportunities for future officers the DoD made language study 
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mandatory for the Service Academies and started the “ROTC Language and Culture 
Project,” a pilot program that has funded initiatives at four universities since 2006.  
McGinn said, “the project seeks to develop and test innovative approaches to affording 
ROTC cadets a vital opportunity to engage in studies that will better prepare them to 
address the global national security challenges of the twenty-first century” and she hopes 
that colleges and universities will respond by offering courses that meet these demands.  
Other government-sponsored programs addressing culture and language skills for 
civilians and military personnel include: Mobile Training Teams from the Defense 
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI) that prepares Americans for 
deployment, the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) and its National Security 
Education Program (NSEP) which of all are designed to “increase the number of 
Americans learning critical need foreign languages.”  There is also the National 
Language Flagship Program that is currently “developing model pipelines of K-12 
students with higher levels of language proficiency into our universities.”  The programs 
augment the previously established Basic Military Language Course (BMLC) at the U.S. 
Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC), the Center for 
Advanced Study of Language (CASL), and Centers of Excellence that “oversee and 
standardize training and impart essential and mission-targeted cultural training to their 
members” (2). 
As extensive as these government programs appear to be, these language and 
culture training programs are designed to reach military personnel at various points in 
their career, especially at the earliest stages.  This is significant because it allows the 
individual to progressively build up a skill set over time rather than learning in short, 
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staccato bursts separated by several months or years.  This is more typical of how the 
military educates but less certain to build long-term competence in cultural 
understanding.  The fact that the Service Academies and ROTC programs are being 
targeted as preferred locations neatly coincides with the arguments of Lt. Col. Hernandez 
and Lt. Col Lewis who both believe an environment and established structure that 
provides scholarly training is best for educating future officers about language and 
culture. Ball State ROTC cadets also adamantly support culture training during this phase 
of their military education and have expressed the desire for much more than they 
received.  However, this research suggests that for the training to be most effective it 
needs to take into account the perceptions of the culture cadets bring with them- not just 
the culture of potential adversaries but their own as well.  This is an area, the second, that 
has not received the attention it deserves.  It also must be noted that although the U.S. 
government heavily endorses “language training” this tends to be equated with “culture 
training” thereby making the assumption that they are one and the same.  This confusion 
could have long-term consequences for the Army‟s attempt to teach staff cultural literacy. 
One method of cultural training for military personnel involves using video 
games.  The technique for using interactive computer systems to teach Soldiers and 
Marines verbal and non-verbal language is discussed in an article for National 
Geographic News written by Stefan Lovgren called, Video Games Help U.S. Soldiers 
Learn Arab Language, Culture 
(http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/42303726.html, accessed 19 October 
2007).  The computer engine behind the games, designed by Hannes Hogni Vilhjalmsson, 
a research scientist with the Information Sciences Institute at UCLA, is intended to 
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replicate foreign environments like Iraq and Afghanistan.  The objective of the game is to 
enable Soldiers and Marines to communicate face-to-face with the local people using 
spoken words and unspoken gestures while responding to various non-verbal behavioral 
cues of the villagers.  If the user is successful he or she will then move on to the next 
training level.  The training system may seem to have a number of weaknesses, but it was 
tested by cadets at West Point in 2003 and is now being used by officers at the 
Expeditionary Warfare School at Camp Pendleton in California. 
Planning and conducting a well-researched and validated educational program is 
one facet of improving cultural awareness within the U.S. military.  Another facet 
involves the use of Human Terrain Teams.  As discussed by David Rohde in an October 
5, 2007 New York Times article entitled, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, 
Human Terrain Teams are “an experimental Pentagon program that assigns 
anthropologists and other social scientists to American combat units in Afghanistan and 
Iraq” (1).  These teams, and the anthropologists‟ involvement, have been highly praised 
by military officials as well as categorically denounced by some observers who find the 
concept unconscionable.  According to Rohde, anthropologists have helped Soldiers 
understand the subtleties of cross-cultural communication and in some cases reduced 
combat operations by as much as 60 percent.  Regardless of public sentiment, Human 
Terrain Teams have become a part of American military plans to engage culture-related 
problems with as many different resources as possible.  Where building cultural 
competency in Soldiers takes time, the employment of academics brings an 
anthropological perspective to a situation long without scholarly input.  This raises an 
important but neglected set of issues about the dissemination of scholarly knowledge into 
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the military.  For example, how can the Army make optimal use of the best available data 
social scientists have on American culture and that of our opponents- potential and 
otherwise? 
 
Debate 
 Since the U.S. government began emphasizing cultural competency its policy, 
doctrine, and training there has been no shortage of criticism from academics.  Some of it 
comes in the form of skeptical newspaper articles reporting anthropologist‟s involvement 
with the U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS) (U.S. Army enlists anthropologists, 
Kambiz Fattahi, accessed 12 May 2008).  Some articles take exception to the covert CIA 
sponsored social science programs of the 1960s and 70s, especially with regards to 
purported issues of torture and interrogation (Buying a piece of anthropology, Part 1: 
Human Ecology and unwitting anthropological research for the CIA, David H. Price, 
2007); implying that the potential for a similar co-option of research exists today and that 
CIA oversight of these military activities is imminent.  Some authors are ideologically 
and politically opposed to any relationship whatsoever between the discipline of 
anthropology and the U.S. government.  This raises the question of what responsibilities 
scholars have to make certain that this country‟s military works off the basis of the strong 
rather than weak scientific knowledge.  This is not a new issue of course, but looking 
back at how this issue has been handled in the past can put some of today‟s polemics into 
perspective. 
 The conflict between anthropology and the military has a long history and 
includes such names as Franz Boas, Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, and Carelton 
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Coon to name a few.  However its contemporary origins begin during World War II when 
anthropologists were actively employed for the U.S. war effort in Europe, Asia, and the 
Pacific.  Since many of those anthropologists were involved in clandestine operations 
their work became classified, a highly debated issue that resonates even today.  Of the 
limited amount of research that was ultimately declassified and published none was more 
influential than Ruth Benedict‟s, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1967).  This book, 
though valuable on several levels, revealed the extent to which an anthropologist can 
influence U.S. foreign policy and have a deep impact on the cultural continuity of a war-
devastated country.  Unfortunately the spirit of cooperation between anthropology and 
government, relations soured with the CIA‟s failed implementation of Project Camelot in 
1964; a DoD venture to develop a social systems model that would allow the government 
to predict and influence significant factors in social change, specifically within 
developing nations.  The backlash this project caused within the discipline of 
anthropology has reverberated across a generation of academic writing concerning 
military affairs.  This is most evident in the positions of David Price, Hugh Gusterson, 
and Roberto Gonzalez that argue against U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, calling anthropological contributions a prostitution of the discipline and criticizing 
the men and women who pass on information that will be used for military activities.  
This viewpoint is tempered in articles like Amahl Bishara‟s Anthropologists Must Enter 
the News About the Middle East and Expand Its Limits (2007) and Montgomery 
McFate‟s The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture (2005).  The last two 
pieces advocate for anthropological participation in military matters as a means to 
mitigate further misconception of foreign culture and its negative impact on civilians. 
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Roberto J. Gonzalez has written several papers expressing his opposition to any 
link between the military and anthropology.  His article, Towards mercenary 
anthropology? The new U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24 and the military-
anthropology complex (Anthropology Today, June 2007) is a two-part criticism of recent 
Army efforts.  Gonzalez criticizes the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, especially anthropologists and its co-authors David Kilcullen and Montgomery 
McFate.  In addition to working with the Bush administration, Kilcullen is also criticized 
for not crediting T.E. Lawrence‟s 1917 work in “Twenty-seven articles (written for Arab 
Bulletin).  Gonzalez, accuses McFate with some justification, of providing the Army with 
an antiquated, structural-functionalist interpretation of culture (2007:15).  McFate seems 
to rely on weak forms of network analysis and readings of opponents culture that seem as 
suspect as those that originated from the WWII “culture at a distance” project 
(Manipulating the Architecture of Cultural Control, Journal of Information Warfare, 
2005c).  Gonzalez also condemns the “military-anthropology complex” as an unethical 
alliance of big-money contractors, social scientists, and mass media that is personified by 
the Pentagon project Human Terrain System.  He argues that “adversary culture,” a 
concept that informs the Human Terrain System project, is unclearly defined, but remains 
a reference point for “soldier-scholars” because the concept provides “ideological 
justifications for military occupation” (2007:18).  Ultimately, he concludes that 
anthropologists who advise counterinsurgency work run the risk of harming those they 
study and doing lasting damage to the discipline because anthropologists could 
eventually be equated with U.S. government agents.   
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In another article, “Human terrain:” Past, present and future applications 
(Anthropology Today, February 2008), Gonzalez criticizes the Human Terrain System.  
Though he describes many of the operational characteristics of the HTS (providing 
commanders with cultural information) Gonzalez links ethnographic information with 
intelligence gathering and disparages the Army for not collecting data concerning the 
validity and operability of the HTS and the Human Terrain Teams. The author raises 
good points but they are obscured by his attacks on the military and anybody who 
contributes to the occupation in Iraq.  Specifically, he argues that the HTS is an 
“espionage programme” with historical ties to Vietnam War-era counterinsurgency 
projects like the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and the 
Phoenix Program.  This is not supported by any evidence but is based on the fact that 
commanders are not willing to share details about ongoing military operations.  Here 
Gonzalez only demonstrates his naivety for how the military works.  Further, his 
demands for information show a disregard for the safety of those involved in ongoing 
military operations. Those who support the Human Terrain Project reply that “given that 
HTS is a new project, it is not possible to have mature outcome evaluation data at this 
stage” and that both Gonzalez and the DoD will have to wait for a complete assessment 
(2008:27).  This begs the question because DoD or some neutral agency should be 
conducting some preliminary form of evaluation while HTS continues to operate in the 
field. 
In an article written for the Annual Review of Anthropology (2007), 
Anthropology and Militarism, Hugh Gusterson describes the discipline‟s relationship 
with the military and warfare.  He discusses the nature of war, the human predilection 
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towards violence, and the scholastic attempts to study warfare in its natural environment, 
whether that is the South American jungles of the 1960s and 70s, war-torn Europe during 
the first half of the 20
th
 century, or the halls of academia.  He describes numerous 
conflicts from around the globe and the anthropological quest for their better 
understanding.  Unfortunately Gusterson does not acknowledge there has been little 
scholarly study devoted to America‟s involvement in different kinds of warfare.  How 
much has been written, for example, on Brigadier General Jack Pershing‟s role in 
counterinsurgency in early 20
th
 century Philippines?  Ultimately, Gusterson concludes 
that there is a recent trend in the post- 9/11 world for anthropologists to debate “the 
merits of military anthropology versus critical ethnography of the military” (2007:155). 
Though there are several other published criticisms of the Human Terrain System 
and other social science research carried out for the Department of Defense the papers 
written by Gonzalez and Gusterson exemplify the arguments found in these other articles.  
Some of the issues that have been raised concerning anthropologists employed by the 
U.S. government include, but are not limited to “weaponizing culture.”  This refers to a 
variety of kinds of unethical research, which among other things, threatens to jeopardize 
future ethnography and puts informants at risk.  There is also concern that research 
generated for the military will become classified and therefore not accessible to the 
academic community.  Additionally, the Commission for the Engagement of 
Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), a 
panel of anthropologists that investigated the nature of the Human Terrain System for the 
American Anthropological Association (AAA), concluded their investigation stating, 
“AAA expresses disapproval of the HTS Program.”  This conclusion was based on the 
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panel‟s findings, the AAA Code of Ethics, and the assumption that anthropologists in 
HTS would not be able to distinguish themselves from military personnel and informants 
would not be able to provide “meaningful informed and voluntary consent.” 
On the other side of the debate is Montgomery McFate.  McFate is not only a 
strong supporter of educating the military, she is also co-author of chapter three of the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual and a Social Science Advisor to the DoD.  Where the 
military has been criticized for its insensitivity towards other cultures McFate realized the 
“cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause- the almost total absence of anthropology 
within the national-security establishment” (2005a) and she endeavored to correct that 
deficiency herself.  It is striking to note, however, that for whatever reason she has been 
unable to enlist the support of many senior practitioners of anthropology.  Like 
Gusterson‟s Anthropology and Militarism, McFate‟s article Anthropology and 
Counterinsurgency also describes the role of culture and anthropologists have played in 
conflicts around the world.  The notable difference is that where Gusterson is focused on 
the negative impact of militarism McFate chooses examples of anthropologists helping 
the military understand the cultural environment (with no exploitation or putting 
indigenous populations at risk) or instances that proved disastrous when cultural 
knowledge was not brought into play.  Her article documents a historically complex 
relationship between anthropology and the military, one fraught with both success as well 
as failure, and not all of it characterized by the CIA domination. 
In another article, The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture 
(2005b), McFate argues the need for cultural awareness programs through a case study of 
the early years of the Iraq War.  Though this article was originally intended to generate 
 50 
support for military-wide cultural awareness programs (it is essentially a request for 
funding such a program) McFate does capture the need for appropriate cultural 
understanding when she says, “misunderstanding culture at a strategic level can produce 
policies that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack of cultural knowledge at an operational 
level can lead to negative public opinion; and ignorance of the culture at a tactical level 
endangers both civilians and troops” (2005b:43-44).  She points to a misunderstanding of 
“physical culture and local symbols” that resulted from inadequate training and describes 
examples of how misunderstood gestures (for both Iraqis and Americans) had fatal 
consequences.  Nevertheless it is an open question whether the kind of anthropology 
McFate practices the models of culture she argues for will have the effect she wants it to 
have.  It is also striking that there seems to be so far at least no assessment of the 
weaknesses and strengths of the HTS approach by objective reviewers.  There are 
alternative approaches; for example, the work Persson and Nyce (Intuitive Tools?  
Design Lessons from the Military Intelligence Community, 2007a; The Design of 
Appropriate Tools and Resources for the Intelligence Community, 2007b) have been 
carrying out on innovation, tradition, and technology in the military intelligence function 
in Swedish forces.  Johnston‟s analysis of CIA institutions and practices is also worth 
noting (The Culture of Analytic Tradecraft, 2005).  Then there is the work Scott Atran 
(“Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?,” 2008) has done on terrorists that has led to a better 
understanding of how terrorists are recruited, how terrorists‟ networks operate and what 
informs and precipitates the kinds of acts of violence they carry out. 
It is not hard not to argue that the U.S. military needs cultural competence at 
every level of its infrastructure.  However, how to generate and provide that knowledge is 
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being intensely debated in academia, blogs, military and anthropology journals, 
quarterlies, and annuals, government briefings, and ad hoc commissions.  McFate and 
other proponents of an anthropologically educated military accuse anthropologists like 
Gonzalez and Price of polarizing the discipline during a time when anthropologists 
should make meaningful, positive contributions that help save lives (both military and 
civilian).  She argues that the “theme of ownership and control is at the heart of recent 
AAA resolutions” (2007) and that nobody should own anthropology.  McFate adds, “the 
view that the military should remain ignorant of anthropology is a truly alarming 
perspective for professional educators.”  And then McFate asks, “is the use of 
anthropological knowledge by the national security community less ethical than the 
censorship and control of such knowledge by academic anthropologists who claim to 
believe in truth and freedom?” (2007).  This finesses the perhaps more important question 
of whether McFate‟s understanding of the kinds of anthropology the military requires is 
correct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
“You‟ve got to leave home at home in a lot of ways and leave your problems from 
home at home and complete the mission.  That‟s what the Army stands on, mission 
first.  You complete the mission and leave everything else at home.” - Ball State cadet  
 
 
Cadet Life- First Impressions 
 
 It is 0600 and I am half asleep, waiting for the first formation of the school year 
and my first as a ROTC cadet.  I have not yet met any of the cadets and I am a little 
nervous.  I don‟t like being the new guy.  Despite talking with several officers and NCOs 
at Fort Bragg I have no idea what to expect.  I know the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
is a college and university based commissioning program.  And I know that at the end of 
my two years at Ball State University I would be a Second Lieutenant.  The Professor of 
Military Science (PMS) told me days earlier that the program was physically challenging 
and mentally demanding, designed to produce quality leaders and nothing less.  However, 
everybody else in the Army tells me that ROTC is a place where students go to “play 
Soldier.” 
Inside the cadet lounge, a rectangular room that contains a television, two 
couches, a long table surrounded by chairs, lockers, and some computers, young men and 
women wearing gray Army t-shirts and black shorts slowly filter in before the mandatory 
0630 formation.  ESPN is on and the cadets that arrive first slouch in the comfortable 
seats that surround the TV in the corner.  The MSIV‟s, the senior cadets in their last year 
of ROTC, gather in groups of two to four, long lost comrades recounting their summer 
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exploits at the Leadership Development Assessment Course, more popularly known as 
LDAC (el-dak).  Some cadets are sleepily discussing the upcoming football season while 
others move among the scattered knots, wide-eyed zombies looking for a clue about what 
they are supposed to be doing.  I was one of those zombies casually eavesdropping on 
bits of conversation, searching for the brains that would direct the rest of us.  Unlike the 
other cadet neophytes, the MSI and MSII underclassmen who wore their newness like a 
fur coat at a PETA rally, I affected the disinterested, annoyed-to-be-awake-and-doing-
the-Army-thing look that is standard issue for the Army units I was familiar with.  As I 
was told later, “nobody knew who you were but you just looked like you belonged.” 
As the minute hand of the clock marched to 0625 I thought to myself, “so much 
for the „ten minutes prior to‟ rule- an Army axiom for being on time.  However, rather 
than give into the mounting anxiety surrounding my impending lateness I waited.  After 
all, if we were all late how much trouble could we get into?  Perhaps it was 
anthropological instinct not to impose my values on another culture, to do as they did, to 
be the unobtrusive participant observer.  Whatever the case, those who had been cadets 
the previous year picked up  folded blue mats (to do sit-ups on) from under a countertop 
and began to trickle upstairs to the gymnasium where we would form up and conduct a 
portion of our physical training (PT).  A senior cadet barked, “let‟s go” and the rest of the 
us numbly followed. 
The yellow lights of Ball Gym glinted on the freshly waxed floors as roughly 
three-dozen cadets fell into one large formation.  The MSIV‟s, as cadet officers (vs. the 
rest of the battalion who were considered to be cadet NCOs), lined up behind the 
formation as they would when they eventually pinned on the gold bar of a Second 
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Lieutenant.  A “high speed” MSIII faced the formation and called the group to attention.  
I snapped to, though I noticed most cadets did so less enthusiastically.   
The MSIII in control of the formation was a clean-shaven male who wore the 
high-and-tight hairstyle common to most of the Army.  He was neither tall nor noticeably 
muscular, but he was wiry and the manner in which he addressed the assembled cadets 
told me that had done this many times before.  He introduced himself as the Cadet 
Sergeant Major (the highest “enlisted” rank for a cadet) and informed us that in the 
coming weeks we would actually be divided into separate company‟s for PT and 
administrative purposes and that today‟s workout would be light.  That being said he 
intoned the commands for an extended rectangular formation, the Army method for 
uniformly spreading out a formation so they have enough room to stretch and exercise 
without running into each other. 
“Atten-tion.”  Since the Cadet Sergeant Major never gave the command “at ease” 
most of us were already in this position, though clearly not everybody. 
“Extend to the left, march.”  Apparently, only about half of the cadets expected 
this as the mass of gray and black lurched and stumbled sideways, arms extended at the 
shoulder.  The formation stopped moving when the person furthest left reached a double 
arm interval from the person on his right. 
“Arms downward, move.”  Everyone dropped their arms, slapping the sides of 
their nylon shorts. 
“Left, face.”  The cadets all pivot on the ball of the right foot though far from 
being in unison. 
“Extend to the left, march.”  Everybody is awake now. 
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“Arms downward, move.”  Slap! 
“Right, face.”  Three cadets turn in the wrong direction and, slightly red-faced, 
hastily perform two right face movements so that they are facing the same direction as 
everybody else. 
“From front to rear, count off.”  The people standing in the first rank, the de facto 
first squad, unenthusiastically yell “one!”  The second squad, no better than the first, 
yells, “two!”  The third squad, a little bit louder, yells, “three!”  And the fourth squad, 
composed of the senior cadets, attempts to compensate for the lackluster motivation of 
the battalion and scream, “four!”  The Cadet Sergeant Major seemed to be unfazed by the 
start to this morning or the somewhat bemused expressions on the faces of ROTC cadre 
standing far behind the cadet formation. 
“Even numbers to the left, uncover.” Everybody in the even numbered squads 
takes one step to the left so that they are standing in between the people in front of them 
but not directly behind them.  Now that the imminent threat of cadet collision has been 
temporarily avoided the process of rotating, stretching, and exercising begins. 
 
In the following weeks the 12 MSIII cadets would take turns leading those who 
showed up for the mandatory PT sessions three times a week.  While the numbers of 
MSIII and MSIV cadets remain fairly consistent the number of MSI and MSII cadets who 
actually attend PT fluctuates with the weather and the academic calendar.  The rule is that 
if a cadet is contracted, if they agreed to serve as an officer in the U.S. Army after 
graduation, then PT is mandatory.  To the dismay of the cadre, cadets who are not 
contracted come and go as they please.  If it is raining particularly hard or they have 
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midterms to study for or they are too hung-over, they just do not show up.  ROTC 
programs across the country do not require a commitment from the freshmen and 
sophomores so those students who want to experience the Army life, for however long 
that may be, are free to come and go as they please.  However, if the cadre responsible 
for recruitment and retention has students who are serious about making the Army a 
career then they work diligently to sign them to a contract a quickly as possible.  A 
contract in the Army usually stipulates four years of service in the National Guard, the 
Army Reserve, or on active-duty.  In return a student usually receives a full scholarship at 
a university.  If a contracted cadet cannot achieve the minimum required score to pass the 
Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) they are put on probation and, in rare cases (at BSU 
at least), kicked out of the program.  In order to be contracted a cadet has to pass the 
APFT. 
PT is perhaps the most basic element of Army life.  The fact that it is the first 
thing a cadet (as well as everybody else in the Army) does every morning symbolizes the 
Army‟s philosophy towards, and commitment to, physical fitness.  This is because 
physical fitness equals mission readiness.  If a cadet is not disciplined and motivated 
enough to attend PT three day a week then they are usually not fit to serve in the Army.  
By his or her attendance a BSU cadet demonstrates their dedication to the program, a 
symbol of their commitment to the U.S. Army and the would-be Soldiers under their 
command.  For the Ball State ROTC program a cadet‟s PT score (points awarded for the 
number of pushups and sit-ups completed in two minutes and two-mile timed run) 
heavily influences the cadre‟s perception of their leadership capabilities (beyond 
commitment and dedication).  The primary reason for this is because ROTC, like the 
 57 
larger Army, subscribes to the idea that a leader must lead in all things.  In short, a leader 
should be a “PT stud,” they should be more intelligent (hence all officers need a four-year 
degree), and should work longer and harder than any Soldier under their command.  
Although the idea that an officer should work more than anybody else appears to be at 
odds with the views of junior officers (Wong, 2000) and cadets alike.  The idea of “being 
the best,” specifically in PT, is strongly encouraged.  This is especially critical at LDAC 
where a cadet‟s APFT score often correlates with their overall camp evaluation.  In other 
words, a cadet who scores a 290 on their APFT (out of a possible 300 points) and screws 
up everything else (obstacle courses, patrolling lanes, etc.) will typically receive a better 
review than the cadet who scores a 220 on their APFT and performs satisfactorily on all 
other tasks. Many cadets take exception to this unwritten policy.  As one female tells me, 
“just because you‟re good at land nav[igation] or you‟re good at PT doesn‟t make you a 
good leader.”  Be that as it may and despite her protests it is generally accepted, however 
begrudgingly, that this is the way things work in ROTC. 
Like with most organizations, a number of paradoxes exist within the ROTC PT 
structure.  First, in an organization that has very specific rules and regulations for every 
aspect of its existence, including corresponding punishments for infractions, it is almost 
impossible to mess up PT.  The worst thing a cadet can do is show up late, however, to 
show up at all is generally considered a plus.  Contracted cadets who are absent from PT 
on multiple occasions may receive a negative spot report or counseling statement and are 
sometimes required to attend a make-up PT session on Saturday morning.  PT is stressed 
as one of the most important factors in a cadet‟s life, yet every year mandatory attendance 
fluctuates and consequences are weak enough to have little or no effect on the situation.  
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Perhaps this is part of a self-discovery process by which no individual other than the 
cadet can discover if they are suited to the Army life for not other explanation was 
discovered.  Second, despite an environment that stresses teamwork as a means to 
succeed in all endeavors, PT is the only ROTC activity that necessarily focuses on the 
individual; a fact made all the more poignant because of its importance to a cadet‟s 
evaluation, both at school and LDAC.  An individual‟s participation and success within 
in the group is symbolic of an officer‟s determination and fortitude, his or her will to 
succeed.  If a cadet cannot push himself hard in front of his peers than how will he be 
able to in front of those he must lead in all things?  Though a cadet is drilled on the value 
of being a team player, in practice, this is never formally assessed, has no effect on 
progress reports, and therefore could be assumed to be unimportant.  Consequently, 
stressing individual performance is a method of getting favorably noticed, carries over to 
LDAC and presumably, into an officer‟s career.  A cadet who deliberately and repeatedly 
eschews the team concept in favor of their own agenda is commonly referred to as a 
“spotlight ranger,” a “bravo foxtrot,” or a “blue falcon”- all terms that mean, “buddy 
fucker.”  Being on time and in the right uniform is an excellent start for a cadet.  Show 
some enthusiasm, faked or otherwise, and moderate progress in physical training and any 
cadet can succeed in the Ball State ROTC program.  This facile approach is lauded while 
academic achievement, something the Army greatly needs, is paid little attention to 
outside.  After all, for a cadet to remain in the program all he or she has to do is receive 
passing grades.  This is eerily reflects the situation U.S. military forces finds itself with 
the Global War On Terror where physical force can not resolve the conflict because it 
rests more on strategy and intelligence than anything else. 
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 PT was an hour long, just like every other session, but it was the only ROTC 
related thing I had to do that day.  The next day, however, I had my first military science 
class- blocks of instruction typically about Army fundamentals like military courtesies, 
drill and ceremony, map reading, battle drills, and operations orders (OPORDERS or 
OPORD‟s).  As I walk up to Ball Gym, the building that houses two ROTC classrooms, 
administrative offices, cadet lounge, and the basketball/volleyball court we work out on 
three days a week, I wonder what I am in for.  Once again I think back to some of the 
advice I received prior to leaving Fort Bragg.  I remember the ROTC recruiter who 
helped me put in the paperwork that would get me accepted to the program tell me, “the 
classes will be long and boring because you‟ve done everything countless times, but 
don‟t fall asleep and let your classmates get as much experience as they can.”  In other 
words, be polite, supportive, and unobtrusive. 
 I head down to the cadet lounge, the inevitable way station for all ROTC students 
in transition.  This afternoon there is more of a sense of purpose though I am not feeling 
it.  Dressed in heavily starched BDU‟s and surrounded by other similarly dressed cadets I 
quickly feel the effects of the windowless, basement confines.  By the looks of it other 
people are feeling the stuffiness too.  Cadets are littered around the room talking with 
each other, checking email on department computers and personal laptops, or signing out 
mandatory equipment from the supply technician.  And of course a knot of students 
sequesters themselves in front of the ever-glowing television.   
I mill around exchanging pleasantries and looking at uniform nametapes and 
checking for combat patches or skill badges (patches represent units and badges represent 
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things done).  I hate sizing up other Soldiers like that, but this is an inescapable fact of 
Army culture and everybody does it, whether they realize it or not, even cadets.  Patches 
worn on the right shoulder signify combat service and skill badges, worn on the left 
breast, publicize special schools the individual attended.  These badges could also be 
awarded for being in a firefight, IED explosion, or some other life-threatening situation.  
The most common badges are for airborne school and air assault school, but there are few 
of these displayed here.  Tabs, representing the hardest schools in the Army (Special 
Forces, Ranger, Sapper are the most “common”) are worn above the unit patch on the left 
shoulder are rare in the “Big Army.”  These are not found amongst any student or cadre 
member (though a Master Sergeant who later came to the program as the senior NCO 
wore both the coveted Special Forces and Ranger tabs).   
I meet a few of my classmates and we strike up idle banter, eyes canvassing each 
other‟s uniforms, haircuts, and boots.  Aside from badges, patches, and tabs the actual 
wear and appearance of  the uniform can reveal a lot about somebody.  Though there are 
strict guidelines (AR 670-1) that are intended to govern this, in practice there are subtle 
variations employed by some Soldiers to flaunt the rules and possibly express some sense 
of individualism.  For example, some blouse their boots (tying the pants around the 
outside of the boot) a little lower than regulation.  Some people wear their sideburns to 
maximum length while others shave their head bald.  The most common variation is how 
people wear their patrol caps (regulation, blocked, “ranger rolled,” caved-in, extreme 
curves on the bill, tipped back off the forehead) or berets (not worn by ROTC cadets).  
Before the recent uniform change when BDU‟s (the woodland camouflaged Battle Dress 
Uniform was adopted in the 1980s replacing the olive drab uniforms worn during the 
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Vietnam era) were replaced by ACU‟s (the Army Combat Uniform has a digital pattern 
and is intended to be worn in all environments, including desert, jungle, and urban 
terrains).  It was mandatory for cadets to wear BDU‟s at LDAC prior to 2008.  Before 
2008  a Soldier could be judged by how much starch was in their uniform, how sun-faded 
their uniform was, or by how much shine their black boots had.  Today it is a little more 
difficult with uniforms that do not require starching or pressing and brown desert boots 
that do not need polish, but some signs of individuality still do exist among the sameness. 
Eventually the MSIII cadets and I head outside for our pre-class formation.  On 
some days we would practice drill and ceremony, moving people in and around the 
formation and marching around the Quad, but today was more a chance for the MSIV‟s 
to inform us of their expectations.  The August sun was directly overhead and a feeble 
wind blew out of the south.  Sweat started to soak my undershirt and pool in my boots 
courtesy the knee-high wool socks.  While we waited for the senior cadets I casually 
surveyed the other students. 
At Ball State, and to some extent LDAC, there are six basic personality types or 
roles independent of an active-duty, reservist, or National Guard affiliation.  These are 
the alpha, the misfit, the administrator, the newbie, the veteran, and the drifter.  These 
cadets can be either male or female and prior service personnel can assume any of the 
roles other than the newbie.  Additionally, cadets can be, and often are a combination of 
these personas. 
Brian, the cadet who led the battalion in PT yesterday, was standing at the head of 
the formation.  His BDU‟s were faded and starched and his boots had worn heels and a 
high shine. Though he did not sport a combat patch he did have a blackened (subdued) 
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set of airborne wings pinned above the U.S. Army tape on his left breast pocket.  Since 
the wings were not sewn on I knew he had not served with a regular airborne unit (pinned 
on rank or badges were not allowed when parachuting because they could interfere with 
the operation of the equipment) but I did have him pegged for an infantryman. 
Brian is a National Guardsman with three years of service and had obtained the 
rank of Sergeant before joining the ROTC program at Ball State in 2005.  Like the 
majority of cadets in Cardinal Battalion he splits his time between his Guard unit and 
ROTC.  Brian is an alpha type personality.  He is headstrong, super competitive- 
especially in sports, actively seeks leadership positions, and has natural inclination 
towards all things military.  He is confident and competent, has passing grades but 
consistently ranks as the best in PT.  Brian is the poster child for BSU ROTC and the 
entire cadre love him.  There are few alpha type personalities at Ball State, a fact possibly 
fostered by Ball State‟s more relaxed and less-competitive environment when compared 
with other colleges and universities.  As Amy put it, 
 
[At] Ball State we have a lot more of a laid back environment.  I think the students tend 
to be a lot more laid back in their training.  At LDAC you always have those people- 
the alpha male stereotypes.  I don‟t feel that we have a many of those here at Ball State 
as what we had at LDAC. 
 
As a counterpoint to Brian‟s cadetness was Kelly‟s misfit behavior.  She was at 
the end of the second squad; two cadets down from me, bitching up a storm.  It did not 
seem to me that she was angry about anything or anyone in particular, but she was 
slinging expletives like a longshoreman.  As I was to find out later, that is how Kelly 
almost always spoke to others.  She is short, slightly overweight, and her blonde hair was 
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starting to come away from the knot on the back of her neck.  Every semester she 
struggles to make passing grades and she has never passed an APFT.  Kelly is not a bad 
person; she is just not cut out for the Army.  Fortunately for her, somebody on the ROTC 
staff realizes this and she is soon separated from the program. 
Standing in the first squad leader‟s position Hal is the model administrator.  
Everything about his uniform, boots, and haircut are regulation.  His patrol cap is worn 
with the bottom edges parallel to the ground and is not folded, bent, creased, or rolled in 
any distinct fashion.  Though Hal is the A Company Cadet First Sergeant during PT and 
off-campus training exercises he is quiet and unassuming in a manner that betrays his 
primary MOS as an infantryman.  He takes charge when he needs to but his true talents 
seem to lie in the way he manages processes and people, even when he is not in a 
position of authority.  His PT scores are not the highest in the battalion but they are far 
from the worse.  Hal is dedicated to knowing his military subjects by the book and is 
often a reference for other cadets.  What makes Hal unique is his ability to seamlessly 
balance his obligations to ROTC and the National Guard with his academic 
responsibilities, maintaining a consistently high GPA.  For the few cadets who can also 
achieve this it was not easy. 
The term newbie refers to those cadets who are not necessarily new to the ROTC 
program, but to the Army in general.  Although there are cadets in all four MS classes 
who have only had Basic Training I do not consider them to be newbie‟s because they 
have been exposed to a closed and immersive environment outside the comparatively 
relaxed ROTC program.  Newbie‟s are those cadets who, by virtue of signing ROTC 
contracts as freshmen, have never experienced anything Army other than BSU ROTC.   
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Our MSIII class has two newbie‟s but you would never know it.  In fact, I did not know 
this until late in the school year.  The only thing they seem to be missing is hands-on 
experience and they make up for that with an enthusiasm for “new” things that other 
cadets do not share with them. 
The cadets who enlisted for three or more years before joining the ROTC program 
are the veterans.  They may or may not have deployment experience in Afghanistan or 
Iraq but they all know how the Army works, for better or worse.  Brian and Hal are 
veterans, but so is Kelly.  Two more veterans are Amy and Gary.  Amy has been in the 
program for two years and comes over from the Air Force while Gary is a veteran in 
every sense having spent eight years on active-duty and participated in the Thunder Run- 
the opening assault into Baghdad in 2003.  The stories these students tell help others 
understand new perspectives of Army culture and at times, the foreign culture they 
interacted with on a daily basis. 
The drifter is the cadet who is contractually obligated to the ROTC program but 
sees it as a formality to becoming an officer.  They drift along from mandatory training 
event to training event because they have to not because they want to.  He or she knows 
what must be done to achieve the end result but they show little enthusiasm for it and 
typically put in minimal effort.  It is not a coincidence that the drifter usually has 
previous experience with military life, either through prior service or their National 
Guard unit.  However, this is not to say that all cadets with experience are drifters.  Quite 
the opposite as the majority are dedicated to the program and their fellow cadets.  It also 
must be noted that although the drifter is not the most enthusiastic person in the battalion, 
rarely are they disruptive or otherwise overtly negative towards other students or the 
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instructors.  Interestingly, the drifter appears to be largely immune to shifts in morale and 
hence contribute to the overall emotional stability of the battalion by not tipping the 
scales in either direction. 
 
What is a Cadet?   
 The young men and women who participate in Ball State‟s ROTC program want 
to be U.S. Army officers and they join for various reasons.  Cadets like Eric, Tony and 
Amy have parents or close family members who served in the armed forces and they 
follow in their footsteps.  Amy tells me, “I think that in a lot of ways I decided to be an 
officer because of things that I saw that were going wrong versus going right.”  Brian and 
Hal wanted more responsibility and more of an impact in their jobs.  Brian states, “I felt 
that I had more to offer than being a Private for four years or a Specialist.  I felt the 
process was too slow and I could take on a lot more responsibility than I had and do more 
for Soldiers as a leader” while Hal adds, “I didn‟t want to just sit back and do my job and 
get by.  I wanted to be active and have a say on what was going on; whether it was what 
kind of training was getting done, how the training was being completed.  And I felt the 
best way to do that was by becoming an officer.”  Carrie, Jake, and Kevin wanted 
adventure while Gary wanted to learn a new skill set that he feels is personally rewarding 
and pays well in the civilian market.  Debbie always wanted to be in the military and for 
her staying enlisted was not an option- “I‟ve been that Private and I don‟t want to do that 
shit.”  I too am driven by the idealistic notion that I would be more productive as an 
Army officer (versus remaining an enlisted Soldier) and of course the work and the pay 
would be better.  More importantly for me, however, was the idea that my education and 
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experience could make a difference in an organization apparently in desperate need of 
youthful, ambitious thinkers. 
Although they are all patriotic and idealistic no one said they wanted to fight 
terrorists (not that they were not planning on doing just that) and nobody joined for the 
money.  These student-soldiers know where their training will ultimately lead them and 
they accept the responsibility they will carry with them throughout their careers.  They 
plan training, evaluate cadet underclassmen, and supervise the operation of the battalion.  
Upon completion of four military science courses, a military history class, and the 
Leadership Development Assessment Course at Fort Lewis they will take the oath of 
office and will receive their commissions in the rank of Second Lieutenant.  But a cadet 
is not an officer. 
 Seven out of the ten MSIII cadets interviewed serve in Indiana National Guard 
units around the state while better than 80 percent of the Cardinal Battalion does as well.  
Their simultaneous membership, however, does not imply there is much, if any, 
connection between their two sets of duties and responsibilities.  On the contrary, 
according to many of the SMP cadets their National Guard units are not sure of their 
exact role.  Some cadets are notional platoon leaders or serve in staff positions while 
others act as squad leaders (a job typically reserved for a Sergeant or Corporal) or 
shadow miscellaneous NCOs and officers throughout the weekend.  According to Amy, 
the Senior Airman turned Army cadet,  
 
I have- we have- no peers.  When we go to our Guard unit we don‟t have peers because 
we‟re not NCOs and we‟re not officers.  And there are a lot of things we are authorized 
to do because we‟re not officers.  They don‟t really have a job for us, even though I am 
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considered a Platoon Leader they don‟t really have a job for me.  I feel like I am in 
limbo as a cadet. 
 
This sentiment is not unusual and represents a status confusion that is prevalent among all 
cadets.  Cadets are neither enlisted Soldiers nor are they NCOs. 
 The term cadet is probably most often equated with someone who is outside the 
rank structure, an individual in transition who is neither here nor there.  He or she is 
much like an IET Soldier before his first assignment (an Initial Entry Training Soldier is 
in the process of attending, but has not yet completed Basic Training and Advanced 
Individual Training.  When an enlisted Soldier completes these mandatory schools they 
are no longer classified as IET.  They are then classified as MOSQ‟d, or Military 
Occupation Specialty qualified). In the Army a transitional identity is associated with 
newness and non-belonging.  This can be detrimental to some cadets, especially those 
who have prior service.  The reason for this lies in the fact that identity and affiliation are 
pivotal concepts within the military as in all forms of social life.  ROTC programs like 
Ball State‟s attempt rebuild an individual‟s previous identity in accordance with its own 
model or models.  This becomes especially problematic for the cadet when he or she has 
to interact with former peers, a meeting made much more difficult by the negative 
connotations often connected with the rank and station of a cadet.  An enlisted Soldier, 
especially an NCO, who seeks to become an officer has, in essence, turned their back on 
a particular lifestyle and community.  Though most enlisted personnel understand a 
Soldier‟s reason for wanting to become an officer they usually make sure that Soldier 
knows how they feel about it, good naturedly or otherwise.  For Amy, being a cadet 
causes anxiety when she is around her former co-workers. 
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 It‟s kinda sad to me because there are a lot of times I don‟t want to tell my peers from 
the Air Force that I did go through all the steps to become an NCO in the Air Force; 
which means that I had the choice to come over in the Army to be an E-5 or to be a 
cadet.  And it‟s one of those things I don‟t want to tell people that I‟m a cadet because 
they laugh at me or they think it‟s funny or the fact that I‟m in a commissioning 
program because I think there is a certain stigma about ROTC to those who are already 
in the military.  They look at the ROTC as not being a difficult program, especially a lot 
of the NCOs.  They think it‟s just fun and games and that we don‟t learn anything.  It‟s 
almost one of those things that I just tell them, „oh yeah, being an officer when I 
graduate‟ but there is no, „oh I‟m a cadet‟ it‟s still, „I‟m an E-5, I get paid as an E-5‟ 
and that‟s how I say it.  I don‟t say „cadet.‟  And I don‟t like putting „cadet‟ on my 
emails and stuff. 
 
Brian also endures his share of criticism from enlisted members of his Guard unit, 
however he knows it is temporary and he does not take offense.  Although he considers 
this to be all to be in good fun he does find it a challenge to handle this duality, these 
shifts and ambiguities of rank, status, and authority. 
 
It‟s different when you go to your unit if you‟re an SMP cadet.  If you‟ve been in the 
unit awhile some of the guys might give you some crap for becoming a cadet and not 
staying enlisted- wanting to go to the officer side.  You get picked on a lot I guess.  
They make up little names and stuff like that…like „cadidiot‟ and stuff like that- just to 
tease.  But at the same time you know and they know when you get the rank that you‟re 
an officer.  Sometimes you can kinda tell when it‟s in a joking manner and when you‟re 
actually messing up.  Usually when it is in a joking manner it‟s out of some kind of 
respect.  That‟s just the way that the enlisted people I know show their gratitude 
towards you- by making fun of you.  I guess that‟s true for a lot of us.  But as far as on 
campus and with other cadets, stuff like that, being a cadet is learning to become an 
officer, learning to become a leader on a different level than the enlisted side.  And it‟s 
a lot wider range; once you become a cadet and you‟re SMP also you have two groups 
that you‟re a part of.  Two groups that you‟re either leading Soldiers in or learning to 
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develop them.  It‟s two kinds of varying groups and two different focuses you have to 
pay attention to. 
 
Even though cadets who are not in a National Guard unit, and therefore not subject to the 
shifts in a particular set of Army identities or the ridicule from peers that results, they are 
not immune from feeling apprehension about the cadet label.  Eric, a newbie whose 
parents are both Army officers, takes a pragmatic approach to his situation. 
 
Honestly…a lot of people think the term is derogatory…and I don‟t like the term.  
Right now, I mostly look at it like I am a college student that happens to be going into 
the military and training for it.  I mean I don‟t expect it to mean a whole lot.  It‟s 
actually the Army that means something. 
 
Every cadet that is razzed for leaving the enlisted corps or experiences negative 
connotations associated with the term “cadet” places somewhat different meaning on the 
word.  For the prior enlisted, those who sought responsibility beyond that of the 
noncommissioned officer and the common soldier, it is a term synonymous with 
abandonment.  The formerly enlisted cadet has denied the life of an ancient brotherhood, 
a union cemented in the trials, tribulations, and hardship of the warrior class.  It is not a 
matter of socioeconomic class or status, but a matter of voluntarily choosing and 
accepting a new life and refusing the old.  Taking on this new role is sometimes seen as 
akin to betrayal in the eyes of the enlisted and they are often keen on letting the offender 
know how they feel, though with somewhat less animosity than towards those who leave 
the service altogether.  Teasing is a socially acceptable means of releasing the tension 
surrounding changes of identity, especially when rank and status shifts are part of this.  
For the cadets who have no prior military experience the role of cadet is a constant 
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reminder of their newness and of the liminal phase (Turner, 1969) they must traverse 
before they can realize self-actualization (rebuild identity) and gain acceptance.  
Similarly, this is why most new lieutenants so desperately crave their first deployment as 
a chance to prove themselves worthy of belonging to the Army. 
For a number of Ball State cadets the issue of identity is something that has to be 
negotiated on a weekly, even daily, basis.  However, on campus a cadet‟s primary 
identity is that of a student.  They go to classes, study for tests, participate in intramural 
sports and internships, and hang out or party when not studying or training.  In this 
regard, a cadet is not much different than any other student on campus, though Amy 
makes an important point acknowledging, “it‟s a balance between being a kid and being a 
partier and knowing that you have responsibilities to the ROTC and to the Army and you 
can‟t do whatever you want to do.  I think in some ways it is the consequences.”  When a 
cadet puts on the uniform that individual becomes a student of Army policies and 
doctrine, tactics and procedures.  The consequences of inattention or laziness here have a 
different reality than failing a test.  Overall, a cadet has a number of identities that allow 
him to move in and out of civilian and military worlds and eventually allow him or her to 
do the same in a world far removed from anything previously known.  Of these roles, 
however it is the one of student that serves him best.  This is what a cadet often will 
discover himself, if only in hindsight.  According to one cadet, “You‟re going to have to 
make yourself accountable and hold yourself accountable…I think that is what being an 
officer is about.  When you make mistakes and you correct yourself, don‟t make it again, 
and you learn.  It‟s a constant learning process.”   
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Symbols and Meaning 
 Being in the BSU ROTC program can often mean different things to different 
individuals.  Cadets like Hal see it as an opportunity to brush up on critical skills learned 
in other Army schools while cadets like Eric see it as their first opportunity to gain any 
experience.  For a few cadets being in the program can even mean a (temporary) loss of 
status but for most, “being a cadet just means getting ready to commission as an officer.” 
All cadets, regardless of their status issues are surrounded by symbols beyond unit 
patches and skill badges.  Rank, station, discipline, and interminable formations are 
enduring symbols of both the Army and ROTC but the ones that most dominate an 
MSIII‟s life are the yellow and blue cards.  A yellow card is a two-sided 5x8 record of 
what a cadet was tasked to do, what they did, and how they did it.  On campus yellow 
cards were usually filled out every time a cadet conducted PT and on rare occasions, 
when they lead a patrol during a field exercise.  At LDAC a yellow card is filled out after 
completing an assigned garrison position (two total), leading a STX lane (two total), or a 
patrolling lane (two total).  The cumulative purpose of these cards is to list individual 
activities ROTC values so that an evaluator can assess your skills and competences and 
make a convincing written argument for how you should be graded.  The yellow card is 
one half an evaluation data, the other half being the blue card.  The blue card is a list of 
16 leadership dimensions that an MSIV or cadre member evaluates when observing a 
cadet‟s activity.  In each category a cadet can receive an E for an outstanding 
performance, an S for an average performance, or the dreaded N for needs improvement.  
Every cadet strives for as many E‟s as possible and sees every N as a sign of failure.  
Similar to letter grades these letters symbolize a cadet‟s worthiness and ability to become 
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an officer and for each cadet represent years of hard work.  Blue cards are more than a 
mere assessment of a cadet‟s ability, they are vital to whether he or she will receive his 
branch and career of choice.  E‟s, S‟s, and N‟s, symbols themselves, are totaled up 
throughout the MSIII year and added to LDAC scores for a composite rating.  This score 
is then combined with the LDAC APFT, university GPA, and other minor activities for 
an overall rating that is posted on the Order of Merit List (OML), a ROTC-wide system 
that compares all cadets seeking their commission in the next year.  Based on this, 
roughly the top 20% are guaranteed to receive the branch of their choice.  The system 
that determines a cadet‟s future branch (i.e. Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, 
Transportation Corp, etc.) is not a transparent one but the pressure associated with 
attaining a high APFT score and favorable evaluations colors every cadet‟s MSIII year. 
 ROTC is synonymous with training and as such no two learning objectives mean 
more than battle drills and operations orders (OPORDERS or OPORD‟s).  PT is 
obviously something that is stressed by the BSU cadre but, to the cadet, it is less 
significant than battle drills and OPORD‟s.  Map reading and land navigation, part of any 
military operation, are important lessons but they are not stressed beyond the first few 
weeks of the fall semester.  OPORD‟s are a method for relaying information to other 
people about a particular mission through a five-paragraph format.  These five paragraphs 
(situation, mission, execution, service and support, command and signal) and their 
numerous subparagraphs are memorized by cadets and are often used in conjunction with 
battle drill rehearsal.  The OPORD, unlike many topics, is a year long focus for the 
MSIII‟s.  Battle drills, coordinated actions for attacking or defending an objective, are 
designed to provoke an almost involuntary response to spoken commands and, as such, 
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necessarily require a lot of repetition.  These drills are symbolic of Ball State ROTC 
because they consistently bring cadets together as a team, a hallmark of all Army 
training.  It is this sense of teamwork, cemented during the intense training of two 
semesters and continued in the early summer months that cadets bring with them to the 
Leadership Development Assessment Course. 
 
LDAC- the Final Exam 
 Fort Lewis is located near Tacoma some 45 minutes south of Seattle.  
Temperatures usually stay in the mid- 70‟s or low 80‟s and it rains almost constantly.  
Interstate 5 splits the post in two and LDAC is held in the section known as North Fort, a 
location that housed and trained some 5000 cadets divided into 13 regiments over three 
months in 2007. 
 For prior service cadets like Gary, Brian, and Debbie LDAC would be very 
similar to other Army schools in terms of organization and function.  For other cadets this 
was their first exposure to the Big Army and military life outside their university‟s ROTC 
program.  Every cadet, regardless of his or her experience, noticed that, “The training was 
more solidly cadet run.  All the cadets do all the work, all the training, all the planning 
and the cadre was there just to make sure we didn‟t screw it up.” 
When I got to Fort Lewis the bus dropped me and approximately 250 other cadets 
off outside a collection of World War II age buildings that would serve as our barracks 
and regimental headquarters.  Army issued duffel bags in hand we were herded into four 
long and winding lines so that we could check in and find out what company, platoon, 
and squad we would be in.  To be sure we did not forget, a cadre member would write 
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this on the back of one of our hands.  It may sound very first grade but those marks were 
like a passport, confirming that we were indeed where and who we were supposed to be.  
It took about an hour for all of us to check in and then we were shuffled to separate 
company and platoon areas to wait on the next officer or sergeant who would guide us 
through the next phase of in-processing.  After standing around for some unknown 
amount of time on surprisingly dusty parade grounds platoons were escorted to their 
barracks where we were given five minutes to use the latrine, find a bunk and a locker, 
pull our medical records out of duffel bags, fill our canteens, and lock up our gear.  We 
new guys, united with the rest of the platoon that had arrived days earlier, however 
briefly, ran out to formation where the assembled mass was harangued for tardiness and a 
lack of motivation.  We were then marched double-time over to an administrative 
building for our formal in-processing.  Once there we were crammed into a very hot and 
poorly ventilated room to fill out and turn in more paperwork.  Once done with these 
forms we were sent to another room in another building to repeat the process.  The forms 
at each stop took about 30 seconds to complete but they were invariably accompanied by 
15 to 20 minutes of sit-and-sweat time.  The Army has a name for this overall technique, 
it is called “hurry up and wait,” and this is only one of many examples that occurred in 
LDAC. 
 After rushing around to half a dozen stations we were sent over to the dining 
facility.  The process of moving through the chow hall was the same on day 1 as it was on 
day 33, only the number of people changed.  To get into line every cadet had to complete 
ten pull-ups, with or without the aid of a buddy.  The line itself was a mass of 
camouflaged cadets that snaked perpendicular to the squat white building.  Each coil had 
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roughly eight to ten cadets standing at parade rest with no more than 12 inches in 
between them.  There was less than that between you and person on your left and right.  
An NCO and a member of the cooking staff whose job it was to make little slash marks 
for every cadet who entered regulated entry into the chow hall.  When the NCO gave 
permission for a group of five or ten people to enter every cadet would sound off with 
their numbered place in line and the name of the regiment.  For example, if I was the fifth 
person from the Red Lion regiment to walk through the door than I would yell out, “Red 
Lion five!”  On a normal day it could take anywhere from 45 minutes to an hour to get 
your food and sit down and about seven minutes to eat and get back outside.  The food 
was decent and better than a lot of other places where I had been.  By an almost 
unanimous decision breakfast is the best meal of the day, probably because you knew 
exactly what you were going to get whereas lunch and dinner were always a toss-up.   
 When we new arrivals had finished dinner chow we went to a new building and 
got into a new line to receive linens.  We were all very tired and many of us were starting 
to feel the effects of jetlag but the wait was, as usual, long and seemingly pointless.  The 
holdup this time was that the one individual in charge of dispensing clean sheets and 
pillowcases could not be found.  After another interminable stretch of time we finally had 
the linens we so desperately wanted to curl up and sleep in, but it was not to be.  
Unfortunately, we made it back to our barracks ten minutes before lights out- the Army 
training ritual in which the lights are shut off and all individuals must be in their beds.  I 
know this and I understand this and on any other night I whole-heartedly endorse this, but 
not tonight.  As it turns out, there is an exception for those just getting in that day.  
Awesome.  Now all I need to do is make my bunk and dig out my personal hygiene bag, 
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a set of PT clothes (where the hell are my running shoes!), and a thousand other items I 
was sure to need first thing the next morning all without making a sound and in absolute 
darkness.  It is just past 0100 hours when I could finally crawl onto the top of my bed, 
wrapped in my poncho liner, otherwise affectionately known as the “woobie.”  I am so 
tired I easily tune out the farts and snores that punctuated the night‟s silence.  On the 
training calendar today was officially classified as day 0.  Tomorrow is day 1 and wake 
up is at 0345.  
 The next day is another long day, characterized by more in-processing, more 
running around, and more waiting.  After morning chow we were shepherded to the 
busses that would take us Old Madigan, the part of the post hospital that was used for 
processing cadets, and the Central Issuing Facility (CIF).  There were not enough busses 
for all of us.  The cadets who did not make it onto a bus were treated to travel by cattle 
car, a metal boxcar towed by a semi-truck that was originally used for hauling various 
livestock.  
  During the first part of the day we were given complete medical examinations 
(with the prerequisite waiting in line) and a pre-packaged meal that contained a 
hamburger bun, some type of canned meat, fruit in a can, juice in a can, chips in a can, 
and a cookie.  These meals are only slightly better than MRE‟s, depending on whom you 
talked to, and are standard fare when away from the chow hall or not deep in the woods.  
The rest of the day was devoted to signing out the Army gear we needed for the next 33 
days.  The CIF is a huge assembly line-like warehouse that distributes equipment like 
sleeping bags, ruck sacks, and uniforms with the proficiency of an assembly line.  Even 
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so, there is the inevitable waiting in lines to get your stuff.  Laden down with awkwardly 
packed and carried gear we board the busses and trucks and head back to the barracks. 
 After dinner the whole platoon crowded onto the first floor of the two floor 
barracks.  Each floor is no more than 400 square feet.  Six bunks line each side of the first 
floor with a latrine and shower on one end and a tiny cadre office and a room for female 
cadets on the other.  The second floor is similar minus the office.  Also where the latrines 
were located on the first floor there are two additional rooms for the females.  Our 
platoon has 53 people, nine of whom are females.  When everyone is settled into a space 
the cadre, or TACS, come out and introduce themselves.  They tell us what their 
expectations are and give us advice on how to succeed at LDAC.  After some final 
instructions the cadre left us to prepare for the next day. 
 Two things they told us reinforced what we had learned in our programs back 
home.  The first was that a cadet was cadet and that there would be no other hierarchy in 
place at LDAC other than the assigned leadership positions.  To facilitate this the 
uniforms we brought from home had to be sterilized; stripped of any combat patches, 
tabs, and skill badges.  Just like in the Ball State ROTC program, prior identities linked to 
one‟s service or training history were erased.  Presumably this was done to encourage 
cadets to rely on the platoon leaders for direction and not the cadets whose prior 
experience and training could be used to challenge or undermine the authority of less 
experienced cadets who happened to be in charge.  Cadets invariably gravitated towards 
those who had firsthand knowledge anyway, not because they were better leaders (though 
some of them certainly were) but because they were willing to share what they knew for 
the good of the platoon.  Leadership positions were never compromised in my platoon.  
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In fact, all the squads were made stronger by the pooled knowledge of those who had 
“been there and done that” before.  The second point that linked LDAC to ROTC at our 
home universities was the notion of teamwork.  Teamwork was the key to success and a 
way to help each other cope with personal failure or the PCS blues.  This is a type of 
homesickness that commonly affects a Soldier far removed from their home and family 
on a training assignment.  PCS blues typically last the first week or two and became 
significantly more pronounced the next day when all cell phones, PDA‟s, and iPOD‟s 
were confiscated for their duration of our training. 
Teamwork was a concept everybody was familiar with because a quick look 
around the barracks revealed cadets helping each other make their bunks (one cadet took 
it upon himself to hold a class on the proper technique for making crisp hospital corners), 
assemble their ruck sacks, and square away their lockers.  Later that night cadets shared 
supplies and squads got together to create their own SOP‟s (Standard Operating 
Procedure)- a method of assigning specific code words, actions, or functions to a member 
of the unit.  SOP‟s were especially helpful during the FTX when a squad did not have 
time to figure out who would be the best medic, who would search the POW‟s, and who 
was good at talking to the civilians on the battlefield.  As Gary, the quiet veteran 
mechanic-turned-nurse, liked to say, “the hallmark of ROTC culture is probably the 
planning…[and] working together.”  Although teamwork was fostered and encouraged in 
ROTC, LDAC strengthened and reinforced the concept through almost every activity 
done during the 33 days of training.   
However, as in Basic Training and AIT, no event could bring a group of Soldiers 
together like bonding through suffering.  When I asked Eric what LDAC was like he 
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described it to me as:  “Long, a lot of boredom, cold, wet, a lot of misery, but a necessary 
part of training.  Not necessarily the tactics you learn there, but more of the team 
building.  How to work as a team and with the cadre…it was about that type of training.”  
Eric expressed that the conditions at Fort Lewis enhanced teamwork and communication 
because everyone wanted to get their task done as quickly as they could so they could get 
inside out of the weather as soon as possible.  The rain and bad weather were something 
almost all the Ball State cadets I spoke to about LDAC remembered and talked about.   
Debbie did not mind the rain as much because she was more concerned about her 
ability to perform under pressure.  Like other cadets she did not want to disappoint her 
campus cadre or her platoon TACS, but she felt more driven to succeed by the 
expectations of her peers and herself.  For Debbie, as well as many other cadets, LDAC 
was more than the ultimate ROTC final exam; it was an affirmation of the person she had 
become. 
 
I would say that LDAC was the most important [training] because you‟re expected to 
pass at everything you‟ve learned throughout the three years.  And you actually get to 
see what you‟re made of once you get out there and you‟re compared with other people.  
You see what you have and can offer to the military. 
 
 One cadet I spoke with saw LDAC differently.  As for, “LDAC as a whole it 
seemed like there were a lot more people that were there to prove themselves whereas a 
lot of us…were just there to get it done.”   For her, this was a very different experience 
from what she had seen at Ball State and in other military schools. 
 
 I also think that at LDAC there were a lot more people that thought they had something 
to prove whereas in a regular military training environment people let their experience 
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take over more so than people having to talk about it.  Some of the other schools it 
seemed like they were more willing to get up and scream at people and talk to people 
like Drill Instructors instead of like people.  And they didn‟t really grasp what 
leadership was…you always tend to relate to the people around you, but I felt that a lot 
of people at LDAC were more standoffish where all they want to do is talk at people 
instead of find out what their real problem was.    
 
 Every company and platoon had those individuals who confused leadership ability 
with the volume and sound of his or her voice.  When these cadets are in a leadership 
position they shine for the evaluators.  They are typically well-informed, decisive, 
assertive, and motivate others.  They seemingly did everything right and their evaluations 
are usually among the best in the platoon.  However, when these cadets are no longer in a 
graded position they could be rude, disruptive, and disrespectful to others.  These people 
are known as “spotlight rangers.”  Brian, a man that puts maximum effort into everything 
he does and expects others to do the same told me, with evident disgust 
 
We had those people you didn‟t want to be with.  There were some…we had those 
people that were at the bottom two of the platoon or the squad and everybody knew it.  
When they were in charge they were compensating.  When they weren‟t in charge [they 
were] sleeping, being the last one up, last one to do something. 
 
When a cadet proves to be a “spotlight ranger” they in profound ways betray the trust of 
the platoon and violate the principles of teamwork.  The result is that these cadets become 
pariahs and are generally avoided as much as possible.  They are never chosen as team 
leaders and they are given minimum responsibility because they are undependable and 
because they, by their very nature, can threaten other cadet‟s evaluations.  Sometimes all 
cadre members are aware of who these people are.  If they are not they definitely find out 
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when peer rankings are turned in at the end of camp.  Cadets ranked in the bottom third 
of the platoon by their peers not only have a lengthy discussion with the platoon TACS, 
but also with their PMS back home. 
 After all the squad and platoon activities were done for the day I wandered up to a 
corkboard that was already plastered with various pieces of information.  Among the 
regimental and company policies, building maps, fire escape plans, and dozens of other 
papers I found the training schedule.  Though there is a color code of sorts it takes me a 
few minutes to understand its organization and abbreviations.  There are so many training 
activities planned for the first 20 days my head spins trying to comprehend the kind of 
timeline we will be held to.  There does not seem to be enough time for all the activities 
scheduled let alone the APFT, map reading and land navigation, basic rifle marksmanship 
(BRM), combat water survival test (CWST), grenade course, obstacle courses, ruck 
marches, field leader‟s reaction course (FLRC), combatives, branch orientation, and 
dozens of other training tasks sandwiched in between.  The day we are scheduled to leave 
for our 10-day field training exercise (FTX) also includes several additional training 
activities planned for the same day - first day out.  Crammed in between patrolling 
techniques and occupying an assembly area is culture training.  One third of a single day 
of LDAC is devoted to the one of the most critical and most critical skill sets in the 
Army. 
 
Culture Training 
 What is culture?  Ball State ROTC cadets tell me that, “culture is everyday life, 
just like being here in Muncie…all the stuff here in Muncie, this is…culture, what I do 
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here everyday.”  And they say that, “culture…is your defining thing about you, what you 
grew up learning, what you‟ve done.”  When they talk about culture these cadets talk 
about family, beliefs, sports, and friends.  They also talk about Army culture and the 
seven Army values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal 
courage) that define what a Soldier does and how they do it.  When describing American 
culture cadets talk about independence, technology, capitalism, and video games.  They 
also talk about movies, politics, and war.  Taken together however, we do not come up 
with a definition of culture that you would find in any anthropology textbook but this is 
what culture means to the men and women who attended LDAC in the summer of 2007. 
  
 My platoon sits on aluminum bleachers that barely hold our number.  We are in 
the shade of a large oak tree and there is a breeze that swirls around our position.  In front 
of us is a stage, a 6x6 “bedroom” that is at the moment concealed by a dark blue curtain 
across the stage.  In the small grass space outside the stage a role player dressed in a qmis 
and shalwar- traditional Afghan shirt and pants commonly found among the Pashtun‟s, a 
pakol (hat) and fake beard sits cross-legged on a rug, holding a mug of chai (tea) and 
poking at the ground with a stick.  Everyone is watching him to see what he would do 
when two officers (himself and an assistant) came around the other side and redirected 
everyone‟s attention.  The Major introduces himself and his assistant does likewise.  
Aided by poster board “slides” propped up on an easel made of lashed together sticks he 
launches into a definition of culture and the value of knowing it.  It is not a bad class, but 
less than what you would learn in the first day of an introductory anthropology class.  Or 
so I thought.  Most of the cadets around me are doodling in their notebooks or have that 
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spaced out look on their face that means they only appear to be conscious.  The fact that 
nothing this guy said was sinking in was later confirmed when I asked BSU cadets 
whether or not they enjoyed the presentation.  Only three of them remembered the 
lecture.  What they remembered best was what came next. 
 The purpose of the role-playing scenarios was to demonstrate the proper 
techniques for executing three separate terminal learning objectives (TLO‟s).  The tasks 
we would be taught were how to conduct a bi-lateral meeting with the village mayor, how 
to conduct knock-and-searches, and how to diffuse a volatile situation using an 
interpreter.  In the first scenario the mayor, the man we saw earlier, and two other village 
elders greeted a five-man squad of volunteers/demonstrators picked from our platoon.  
The squad‟s mission was to talk to the mayor about setting up a radio tower in the village, 
but it never got that far.  Instead, the squad, and by extension the observers, learned that 
this mythical culture (an amalgamation of Iraqi and Afghan cultures that happened to 
speak Spanish) violated American notions of politeness and doing business by doing 
things at a pace the cadets were unfamiliar with.  Squad members endured much small 
talk about family, weather, and geography while they politely ate strange meats from a 
bowl and tea with grass clippings sprinkled over the top.  Though the concept that 
different cultures value such talk and can reveal important things about themselves 
through it was probably the more valuable lesson taught that day it was easily 
overshadowed by the odd looking and distasteful foods they had to eat, a favorite topic of 
conversation among the volunteers.  From the point of view of the role players, the first 
obstacle to any mission is having to eat and drink anything that is put in front of you.  
They knew this and decided to have some fun with the cadets by making the food and 
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drinks they offered as foul tasting as possible.  When the squad leader finally decided to 
press the issue of the radio tower the mayor separated him from the others and the elders 
did likewise with their targeted cadets.  Of the three separate conversations taking place 
none of them were about a radio tower.  When it became obvious that the mission was 
stalled the Major halted the exercise.  His message- do not promise anything that you 
cannot personally deliver, stay focused on the mission, and do not get bogged down in 
extraneous conversation.  
 Where the overall lesson in the third TLO was primarily concerned with being 
aware of interpreter agendas the second scenario treated culture as an obstacle.  I was the 
member of a squad assigned to enter a village and a conduct knock-and search, a method 
for “politely” asking local villagers if they have weapons and then “respectfully” 
searching their home.  Armed with the knowledge that the Palomans predominately use 
their left hand, do not observe physical space, and do not allow men to talk to their 
females we approach the “house.”  The squad leader asks the man if he has any weapons, 
to which he replied that he did not, and then directs everyone to come outside so that they 
can be searched.  A woman in a burqa comes out and a female from our squad conducts 
the search.  The man does not want to let us in because he says that his brother is very 
sick and that his religion prohibits anybody from entering the room.  The squad leader 
argues that we need to search his home and after a lengthy discussion the man allows me 
to have a quick peak inside the room where his brother is laid out in repose and covered 
by a body-length mosquito net.  I tell the squad leader that I did not see anything and 
when we make to leave the instructor stops the scenario.  He points out a few things we 
did right and then asks the Paloman if he had any weapons.  The Paloman said that he did 
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and pulled out a (mock) RPG that was nestled between the wall and his “sick” brother.  
The Major rounded on the squad leader and myself and demanded to know why we did 
not find this item.  I told him that I did not see the weapon and that I was wary of 
disturbing the sick brother.  That is when the Major told all of us that we could not allow 
language barriers, religion, or any other cultural nuance to get in the way of completing 
the mission, adding that civilians will often lie to Soldiers to get them to go away.  
Ultimately the message conveyed was an attitude of “culture be damned” and “mission 
first.”  When I asked Eric about his experience he said that the training was frustrating 
and a little confusing. “The only thing I can say is, „through the culture I‟ve got to get my 
mission done.‟  Where is the line drawn at?  Where can I say, „fuck your culture, go to 
Hell, I got to do this?‟  When do you say that?  That‟s the hardest thing you can do.”  Hal 
was calmer but equally frustrated about what he perceived to be a lack of both training 
and direction. 
 
When you receive a mission you need to complete a certain task.  When one of the 
obstacles is culture and having to deal with people it is hard because you want to make 
sure that you complete your mission.  That‟s certainly the essential task and at the same 
time you got to understand culturally, „are we doing the right thing to make sure our 
presence here is a good presence and do I think people understand what we‟re doing 
and why we are doing it?‟  I think when you‟re not trained enough on cultural 
awareness then you come across those situations that we‟ve had problems with in the 
past.  It will take longer for you to complete the mission.  It will take longer for you to 
figure out what you‟re going to do. 
 
Although I understood the Major was attempting to convey a sense of the 
imminent danger inherent in every Soldier‟s every task and mission it was not until later 
that I began to question the subtler message that was being communicated.  Did I 
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understand it correctly?  Is culture an expendable luxury?  What did the other cadets 
think of the training?  When I asked Hal he guffawed, 
 
It‟s never really addressed how to deal culturally with other people.  I don‟t think the 
training really shows you how to deal with someone from this country or that country, 
this religion or that religion.  I think overall, the focus at LDAC right now, and 
throughout ROTC, is how to run the squad STX and how to run the patrolling.  And 
when cultural variables are thrown in there I don‟t think that is really addressed.  A big 
part of culture training, again it was only about half a day, but from what I took away 
was how to deal with a friendly foreigner, not so much the enemy.  But if you need to 
go to someone‟s house and conduct a friendly search of their house how do you deal 
with those people and explain to them what you‟re doing, how you‟re doing it?  Overall 
I would say that I really haven‟t been taught a whole lot about culture.  But as far as 
cultural awareness in the military…it is hard to really say that I am culturally aware and 
understand the situation. 
 
Eric told me; despite all its shortcomings the exercise taught him that culture does impact 
a mission and that it was something he needed to take into consideration. 
 
It doesn‟t make me more knowledgeable about cultures but makes me stop and think, 
„hey before I get there what else should I be getting.‟  It‟s not necessarily the awareness 
but the „hey, is this how their culture really acts?‟ and if it is then is it acceptable for 
their actions toward me or my actions towards them?  My ignorance is based on my 
cultural knowledge. 
  
Debbie summed it up by saying that, like it or not, “you have to treat everyone like an 
enemy because you don‟t know how they‟re going to react.”  What troubled cadets the 
most is not being able to predict the consequences of their actions might have and fearing 
the worst.  Making the wrong decision in a training environment could incite a (mock) 
firefight and will undoubtedly get your ass chewed out by the NCOIC or OIC.  Making a 
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similar mistake in the real world could get people killed and/or irrevocably damage 
relations in that area, further endangering U.S. strategic aims as well as the lives of 
Soldiers and civilians.   
 Despite the obvious limitations of TLO‟s at LDAC Ball State cadets liked the 
cultural awareness training and wanted more of it.  However, I found some curious 
omissions in ROTC‟s overall approach to building cultural awareness.  In 99% of training 
Army-wide, from Basic Training to the Sergeant Major Academy and from ROTC to the 
Command and General Staff College, the tenants of teamwork and hands-on experience 
are stressed.  In those rare cases where teamwork is formally not allowed most Soldiers, 
cadets, and officers still find a way to help each other out in whatever way they can.  
What made the cultural awareness training at LDAC counterintuitive to all other Army 
training was the fact that hands-on experience was extremely limited and there was not an 
opportunity for teamwork to evolve through, for example, participation in a series of 
exercises and tasks that dealt with the same issue.  Carrie expressed her preference 
saying, “It helped me just to- instead of watching it- doing it because I am more action 
than watch.”  Further, the message the role-playing scenarios conveyed was the idea that 
culture was an obstacle to be overcome by the ingenuity of the team, specifically the 
officer-in-charge.  Unsurprisingly, many of the cadets did not exclusively rely on what 
they learned from the TLO‟s; instead utilizing the time-honored tradition of teamwork 
and they wanted to learn how cultural competency could an advantage, not just an 
obstacle, on the battlefield. 
 
Applying Cultural Awareness 
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 Although I had never heard culture so blatantly referred to as a potential obstacle 
as I did during those TLO‟s this is not the first time I was taught by the Army that culture 
was an obstacle.  At the Camp Atterbury (IN) CFTX, a combined field training exercise 
held every April that involved ROTC programs from several universities in our brigade, 
my squad was tasked with gathering information on a newly constructed bunker.  As we 
slogged through the woods we encountered a “civilian” on the other side of a clearing 
talking to himself in Farsi.  Being the point man for this mission I signaled my squad 
leader and told him what I saw.  Since they civilian appeared to be unarmed I was 
ordered to try to make contact with the very broken and rusty Farsi I could still remember 
from my days as a PSYOP Soldier.  From afar he said hello in Farsi and I responded in 
kind, asking him how he was doing and motioning for him to come and talk to me.  As 
the man carefully picked his way towards me he kept gesturing to the sparse area around 
saying, “khatar, meenha; khatar meenha,” which I remembered to mean, “danger, 
mines.”  I passed the information back.  After hugging the civilian and kissing each other 
on the cheek, exchanging food and water, and making small talk the man told me that he 
knew the men in the bunker and that they would gladly quit working if we gave them 
food and water.  When all was said and done we completed our mission without a shot 
being fired; a fact that we were all very proud of.  I mention this story because in this 
instance knowing something about the local culture enabled the squad to avoid the 
minefield.  Knowledge of basic phrases while not avoiding close contact and food sharing 
resulted in some level of trust.  Every other squad that day failed to respect, or at least not 
overreact to, the most basic cultural tenants, and they failed the mission. 
 89 
 Role players at LDAC repeated and emphasized the same set of themes.  
Regrettably, like the CFTX there were too few situations that allowed cadets to go 
beyond learning that culture was something that had to be “overcome.”  In one exercise, 
for example, the Spanish language was intended to be an obstacle that impeded 
cooperation with the “locals,” but this failed because many of the cadets were native 
Spanish speakers.  However, the one obstacle that did impact every squad at some point 
during the FTX was the host nation‟s view of women.   
Of the 10 days in the field, four were spent on the STX lanes (each lane was 
approximately 200 to 350 meters long and had an objective that needed to be completed 
in an allotted amount of time) and two on the patrolling lanes (two squads formed a 
platoon and were required to complete an objective that covered approximately 1000 to 
2500 meters).  Cultural contact during the patrolling lanes was minimum because the 
focus was on controlling and covering a lot of heavily forested terrain in a short time.  
Two of the four STX lanes had little to no cultural component while the other two were 
known as “variable lanes” (because ever squad had been on it a least once) and had actors 
that did more than shoot at you. 
Although in one exercise language was not a factor female cadets were seemingly 
challenged every step of the way.  A female squad leader was not allowed to talk with 
any of the “locals” and had to speak through a proxy.  The male who interceded on the 
behalf of the female was ridiculed for taking orders from a woman and negotiations 
faltered as a result.  Interestingly, whenever this happened cadre encouraged cadets to 
treat the locals as a physical obstacle to be bound, gagged, and carried to the rear lines.  
They, in short, could not be allowed to interfere with the mission and if they could not be 
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reasoned (as North Americans understand the term) with then they were a liability to be 
removed by whatever means possible.  In other situations females could not act as medics 
because they were not allowed to touch a male from the opposite culture.  During one 
particular mission we came across two friendly foreign soldiers who had been seriously 
wounded in a mortar attack.  As we approached them we came under fire, forming a 
hasty perimeter.  While most of the squad members were tasked to neutralize the threat 
two females worked to stabilize the casualties.  This division of labor of course reflected 
and reinforced conventional American expectations regarding gender.  In the end, their 
help was unwanted and one of the foreign soldiers killed the other because he had 
become “unclean.”  Though the lane TAC advised us to “let them die if they did not want 
help” the squad found this exercise to be thought provoking.  This exercise would alter 
the way we planned and executed future missions.  As it turned out, every squad who 
went through this exercise came to a similar realization.  As one cadet put it, 
 
Things that are accepted here might not be accepted there.  And I think that is all part of 
the balance of being, not just an officer, but being a Soldier.  It‟s figuring out- and in a 
lot of ways being a person in society, being within all of these different cultures…it‟s 
figuring out when and where things are acceptable. 
 
So did cultural awareness training instill any kind of competency or adaptability 
in cadets?  To a certain degree the answer is yes.  Although the TLO‟s were really more 
of a reminder that culture would be a factor during the upcoming FTX cadets learned to 
rely on their teammates, as sources of relevant knowledge in order to supplement poorly 
understood concepts the Army had taught them and to enhance mission success.  Ball 
State cadets reported that each of their squad‟s had a couple of individuals that they felt 
 91 
understood people better, could speak with others more easily, or were more inclined to 
stay cool under pressure.  One cadet told me, “I think your mission evolves from the 
culture.  I think your mission is about understanding the background of the people.”  This 
usually translated into relying on somebody on a mission who had prior experience or 
training and certainly somebody who knew more than what the cultural awareness 
training had provided that summer.  For example, Amy‟s squad had a cadet who had 
traveled all over the world while growing up because his father was an Army officer.  
According to Amy, he was excellent source of information because he helped the squad 
understand what it was like to live somewhere and not speak the same language or even 
eat the same foods.  Brian had a teammate who was always “cool as a cucumber” and 
was the perfect choice to handle media and civilians on the battlefield.  Another cadet 
told me that his squad had a prior service cadet who used to be a desk anchor with AFN 
(Armed Forces Network- a television station that broadcasts to military personnel around 
the world) and his public affairs background was especially helpful.  Debbie, recounting 
her success at the FTX proudly told me,  
 
You would have to be very flexible going into that situation [where there are civilians 
on the battlefield].  And you‟ve got to know the background of the civilians on the 
battlefield and the background of why it is going on- around the entire situation.  So 
you just have to be flexible and be willing to accept any kind of situation.  
 
This was enabled by her teammates, their diverse backgrounds, and their willingness to 
share any additional insight others were not privy to.  She added, 
 
As squad leader‟s I think we were alike because we were all pretty excited that we 
knew something.  We all knew each others intent and we were all there to back each 
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other up so each of us could get the best possible rating at LDAC.  So we had a mutual 
agreement that we wouldn‟t be blue falcons and we would always back each other up.  
We created our own SOPs…they were needed so that we could successfully complete 
the first training we had. 
 
So how do other cadets overcome this model of culture as an obstacle to mission 
success?  Cadets obviously rely on planning, teamwork, and communication when 
accomplishing any task, particularly under stressful conditions.  Brian tells me that 
cultural competency is an important factor in any mission and that officers and NCOs 
need to ensure that everybody has been properly briefed on the situation and the cultural 
components relevant to that objective.  They need to be given enough time to figure it out 
as a team and that information needs to be communicated, reviewed, and tacitly 
understood prior to leaving for the mission.  According to Brian, “…you‟ve got to keep it 
[cultural awareness] in the forefront of your mind, not in the back when you‟re under 
pressure.  I think if you have it consciously on your mind all the time then you‟re going 
to be aware and not mess up and get hit.”   
Another key component related to cultural competence is the ability to adapt to the 
situation on the ground.  When describing the FTX at LDAC Debbie recounts the 
sometimes intentionally vague nature of some missions.   
 
You have no knowledge about what is going on around you so you have to base your 
mission on the culture even it that may not be your mission as a whole.  But in order to 
be successful and have the least amount of casualties you have to go in there very 
knowledgeable about the culture, about what is going on around you, about how the 
people are in order to accomplish the mission.  I think it would be better if you have to 
understand the culture and you had to do the mission together. 
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Expanding on this idea Brian adds, “You‟ve got to adjust to the situation while still 
keeping your focus.  It can be difficult when you‟re not thinking about…when you‟re too 
focused on the culture and not enough on the mission, but being able to think back and 
forth between both is very important.”  Adaptation is especially critical when working 
with diverse human populations, possibly unaccounted for during the initial higher-level 
phases of mission planning.  With some consternation Amy told me, “I think the toughest 
things is balancing your mission with the mission of that culture as far as mixing that 
with the friendlies from that culture…and so I think it‟s meeting the needs of those, your 
culture and theirs, your mission and theirs.”  Perhaps the most important factor to 
acquiring some culture competence is learning to see culture not as an obstacle, but rather 
as a learning opportunity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
“How one looks at organizational culture largely determines what it is.”  - J. Steven Ott, 
1989  
 
The purpose of this project is to identify what ROTC culture is and determine 
what culture and culture awareness training means to Ball State cadets.  This research 
takes into account three factors - the cultural context of a Ball State ROTC cadet, the 
cultural awareness training they received at LDAC in the summer of 2007, and the need 
for cadets to have access to viable cultural literacy programs.  
During a cadet‟s time in the program he or she learns to synthesize the specific 
tenants of university culture and the values and beliefs of the U.S. Army, forming a 
culture that is predicated on balancing the educational requirements of a baccalaureate 
degree (and in some cases, a masters degree) with the methodical indoctrinization of the 
U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps.  This cultural system, one that is neither 
purely academic nor fully military, represents a liminal zone (Turner, 1969) that prepares 
the individual to ultimately assume the duties and responsibilities of an officer 
(incorporation phase).  As a consequence of this liminality a cadet‟s attitudes and 
opinions are continually influenced by both the organizational culture of ROTC and the 
Army as well as the social norms of the university.  This result is a disjunction 
concerning how culture is perceived and how it is used. 
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An analysis of the data reveals that ROTC culture, and consequently culture 
awareness training, has a potentially different meaning to Ball State cadets and LDAC 
instructors.  This is exemplified in the cadet perception that “culture is part of the 
mission,” a system of rules that should govern one‟s actions in all but the most dire 
circumstances.  At best, this notion is idealistic in that it assumes that the individual 
officer will be able to appeal to reason over, or otherwise influence a specific obstacle 
(here culture) so as to achieve the penultimate and ancient army imperative- to fix, close 
with, and kill the enemy.  At worst, it assumes the Army is, with its present resources, 
capable of understanding cultural nuances that occur in almost every mission.  What 
LDAC exercises seem to reinforce is the cadre‟s view that a host nation‟s culture should 
not impede mission completion under any circumstances; indeed that culture is an 
obstacle more quickly overcome by the use of force.  The fact that Ball State students and 
the ROTC program do not perceive culture this way suggests that current culture training 
initiatives for cadets may be incompatible with the organizational culture of the U.S. 
Army. 
Perhaps one of the greatest reasons why ROTC and the Army as a whole do not 
conceptualize culture in the same way stems from the fact that they operate within 
separate and distinct organizational cultures.  J. Steven Ott (The Organizational Culture 
Perspective, 1989) states, “if organizational culture is defined as beliefs and values, then 
cultures develop through the processes by which beliefs and values are learned” (84).  
Accordingly, he lists three mutually supporting sources of organizational culture, 1) “the 
broader societal culture in which an organization resides,” 2) “the nature of an 
organization‟s business or business environment,” and 3) “the beliefs, values, and basic 
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assumptions held by founder(s) or other early dominant leader(s)” (75).  It could be 
argued that the Army is shaped organizationally and ideologically by the emphasis it (and 
the nation) places on “mission.”  Furthermore, it can be argued that this emphasis has led 
to the Army, in its training of cadets, treating culture as though it was an obstacle. 
Although it could be debated that ROTC and the Regular Army reside within the 
same “societal culture” for the purposes of cultural training they do not.  Ball State, like 
other universities, is situated within an academic community dedicated to the pursuit of 
knowledge and scholarship.  Young men and women study a number of subjects based on 
the requirements of a degree or based on genuine interest.  The majority of their 
professors are there because they want to be and because they have a passion for teaching 
and research.  With the exception of special assignments, military instruction is insular- 
specific posts conduct vocational training for selected personnel and Army-wide subjects 
like first-aid and land navigation are (literally) taught by the book (specific field manuals 
and training manuals).  The personal interests of the student Soldier is immaterial. 
While the President of the United States and subsequent foreign policy dictates 
the “business” of all military affairs there are subtle differences in the way the various 
components of the Army carry out their tasks, though they are often interconnected.    
Both ROTC and the Army as a whole are responsible for training warriors and leaders as 
well as perpetuating Army culture.  However, the biggest difference is that a ROTC 
program like Ball State trains and indoctrinates leaders largely inside a particular context.  
That is to say that, unlike the rest of the Army, ROTC is neither rapidly reassessing its 
techniques and procedures for developing competent leaders at the individual school 
level (the ROTC curriculum is dictated by Cadet Command).  Nor are they necessarily 
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required to do so (cadets will not die if lessons learned from the most recent deployments 
are not immediately incorporated into the program).  Because Army units operate in real 
world, life-and-death, situations the onus is on them to quickly correct deficiencies so 
that the next unit does not suffer the same consequences or relay successful strategies so 
others may employ them.  ROTC does not work with the same pressures.  This is 
exemplified by a common phrase from ROTC instructors that states, “you‟ll learn it from 
your unit when you get there.”  These instructors, some having served 20 years or more, 
can say this because they know that ROTC programs are only meant to provide the 
student with a generalized understanding of military subjects versus the more in-depth, 
task-dependent training a regular unit provides.  Ultimately, it is easier to convey a single 
message about the battlefield and mission, one that became strikingly obvious during 
LDAC, that culture is most often an obstacle to be overcome through the correct 
application of battle drills and the warrior ethos.  But these few examples show that 
ROTC and the Regular Army‟s “business and business environment” differ significantly 
by way of mission set and context. 
However, both organizations are defined by the same values and beliefs starting 
with the Founding Fathers.  The most notable difference according to Neiberg (Making 
Citizen Soldiers, 2000) is that ROTC programs were instituted as a check against the 
(feared) military elitism of the service academies (West Point, Annapolis), and would 
produce officers who had greater ties to, and more loyalty towards, the communities in 
which they were raised.  Although Ball State ROTC is traditionally a school that turns out 
officers for the National Guard (19 out of 24 commissioned in 2007 and 2008) there 
seemed to be little operational difference between it and similarly sized schools that 
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commissioned more active-duty officers.  When describing the character of an 
organization, in this case comparing ROTC with other Army units, the biggest factor lies 
not with Founder‟s ideals but with leadership of the recent past and those currently in 
place.  While it is true that officers are not with their units very long before being 
reassigned what they do while there can impact generations far removed from word or 
deed.  For example, the heroic actions of Audie Murphy during World War II are a 
lasting part of the legacy of the 3
rd
 Infantry Division.  Although Audie Murphy is well 
cited in the lore of the Army as a whole he is specifically a hero of the 3
rd
 ID, providing a 
model of honor, duty, and courage that members strive to emulate.  Generally speaking, 
ROTC programs do not have heroes that define the program.  Ball State certainly does 
not.  Current commanders and leaders throughout a unit organization will exert influence 
on its men and women; either through their training standards, their leadership style, or 
by some other means positive or negative, adding to the culture of battalion, company, 
platoon, etc.  ROTC also falls into this category, however, the organization is much 
smaller (Army divisions and regiments compared to individual school programs) and 
there are fewer opportunities to create a lasting legacy especially given the course 
curriculum. 
This research suggests that ROTC culture training is also ineffective because it 
unsuccessfully attempts to bridge two competing paradigms; the traditional Army model 
bent on dominating one‟s opponent and the current Army model that prizes adaptability, 
flexibility, and cultural competency.  The end result for this project is that Ball State 
cadets receive contradictory and confusing instruction about what culture is - one that is 
at odds with a cultural concept as defined by a liberal arts university and by the broader 
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academic community.  What the cadre members learned during culture training that 
summer tended to promote the notion of culture as an obstacle (often because they knew 
or were given no other way of conceptualizing it).  This view of culture is reinforced 
throughout one‟s military education, leads to a simplified normative understanding of 
culture and this is seldom questioned by staff and rarely, if ever, deconstructed. 
In light of the data collected during this research the question remains:  are there 
any alternatives for providing ROTC cadets, as well as others throughout the Army, 
better resources for cultural awareness training?  Yes and no.  Ott tells us that temporary 
changes in leadership cannot successfully institute long-term changes that run counter to 
an organization‟s culture or mission because its members will resist all attempts, 
placating the leader-come-usurper for only as long as it takes for them to leave or be 
ousted.  However, Ott also states that in order to effect more permanent changes to an 
organization‟s culture or mission a leader must influence others to think and act as he 
does so that when he leaves his disciples will perpetuate those values (exponentially as 
they rise through the ranks).  Herein lies the crux of the matter; ROTC cadets, being 
highly susceptible to influential leaders as a means to develop successful career and role 
strategies (Turner‟s liminal zone), are learning to treat culture as an obstacle.  Further, 
this is repeated and reinforced over time, cadre by cadre.  In order to break this trend it is 
necessary for the Army to put experienced, culturally competent leaders in key positions 
where they will have the most influence; specifically, as LDAC instructors.  But this will 
not be enough.  Getting professional anthropologists involved somewhere (preferably 
within the liminal zone) within the military education process is imperative.  Another 
method for accomplishing this mission of cultural literacy would be the development of 
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pedagogical models that takes advantage of the Army‟s established system of hands on 
leaning and teamwork as well as the experiences and perceptions of those Soldiers who 
have been culturally immersed before.  Instead of relying on high-ranking officers and 
policy makers to dictate which cultural literacy techniques should be developed and 
instituted.  This should be done ground up; that is to say let those who know do.  
Utilizing methods like these is one way to promote flexibility, adaptability, and cultural 
competency in the leaders of tomorrow and today.  Further research aimed at 
understanding how culture is perceived and utilized both within the force and by 
opponents is necessary for the Army if it is to be successful in its missions in the 21
st
 
century. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
  
 Acronyms  
 
AAA- American Anthropological Association 
ACU- Army Combat Uniform 
AFN- Armed Forces Network 
AIT- Advanced Individual Training 
APFT- Army Physical Fitness Test 
AR- Army Regulation 
ARNG- Army National Guard 
BCT- Basic Combat Training 
BCTP- Battle Command Training Center 
BDU- Battle Dress Uniform 
BMLC- Basic Military Language Course 
BOLC- Basic Officer Leadership Course 
BRM- Basic Rifle Marksmanship 
CA- Civil Affairs 
CASL- Center for Advanced Study of Language 
CEAUSSIC- Commission of the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security 
and Intelligence Communities 
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency 
CIF- Central Issuing Facility 
CDT- Cadet 
CFTX- Combined Field Training Exercise 
CG- Commanding General 
CGSC- Command and General Staff College 
COB- Civilians on the Battlefield 
COE- Contemporary Operating Environment 
CORDS- Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support 
CWST- Combat Water Survival Test 
DLI- Defense Language Institute  
DoD- Department of Defense 
FLRC- Field Leader‟s Reaction Course 
FM- Field Manual 
FRAGO- Fragmentary Order 
FTX- Field Training Exercise 
GWOT- Global War on Terrorism 
HOA- Horn of Africa 
HTS- Human Terrain System 
HTT- Human Terrain Team 
IED- Improvised Exploding Device 
IET- Initial Entry Training 
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LDAC- Leadership Development and Assessment Course 
MOOTW- Military Operations Other Than War 
MOS- Military Occupational Specialty 
MRE- Meals Ready to Eat 
MS (I, II, III, IV)- Military Science (first year, second year, etc.) 
NCOIC- Noncommissioned Officer In Charge 
NSEP- National Security Education Program 
NSLI- National Security Language Initiative 
OIC- Officer In Charge 
OML- Order of Merit List 
OP- Operations 
OPORD- Operations Order 
PCS- Permanent Change of Station 
PFC- Private First Class 
PL- Platoon Leader 
PME- Professional Military Education (system) 
PMS- Professor of Military Science 
PSYOP- Psychological Operations 
PT- Physical Training 
ROTC- Reserve Officer Training Corp 
RPG- Rocket Propelled Grenade 
SF- Special Forces 
SMP- Simultaneous Membership Program 
SOAR- Special Operations Aviation Regiment 
SOF- Special Operations Forces 
STX- Situational Training Exercise 
TM- Technical Manual 
TRADOC- Training Doctrine 
USACC- United States Army Cadet Command 
USAJFKSWC- United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
USAWC- United States Army War College 
WARNO- Warning Order 
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Line of Questioning 
 
Demographic data 
 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Hometown 
 Academic major 
 Prior service (if so, number of years & branch) 
 Number of years in ROTC 
 Scholarship/non-scholarship/National Guard/Green-to-Gold 
 Deployment 
 Military schools attended 
 Assigned branch 
 Family in military (officers or enlisted) 
 Number of foreign countries visited 
 
Culture 
 
 How did the training/people differ from the training/people at school? 
 What were the other cadets like?  How are they alike/different than BSU cadets? 
 What was the cadre like?  How were they alike/different than BSU cadre? 
 What does culture mean to you?  How does that compare with society? 
 Where did you learn about culture? 
 How did you learn what culture is? 
 What does being a cadet mean? 
 Have you ever been to a foreign country?  Deployed?  If yes, tell me about it. 
 Tell me what you think people in the Middle East are like.  Why? 
 What is Army life like or what do you think it is like? 
 How do you think ROTC has prepared you for life in the Army?  Why? 
 How does ROTC differ from other groups on campus?  Why? 
 Tell me about your time in ROTC 
 Tell me about the cadets that you feel are the most successful.  Why? 
 Tell me about cadets who are having a hard time with ROTC.  Why do you think 
they are having a hard time? 
 What do think are the differences between officers and enlisted Soldiers?  Why? 
 How are cadets different from other military personnel? 
 Tell me about an average day as an ROTC cadet. 
 When learning about foreign cultures, what type of media do you consult the 
most?  Why?   
 What people have cultural knowledge? 
 Where do you get your knowledge about foreign cultures? 
 How has the Army or ROTC changed the way you think about culture?  Why? 
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 What kind of cadet do you respect the most?  Why?  The least?  Why? 
 Why do you want to be an officer? 
 Why did you choose the Army? 
 What is the difference between National Guard, Reserves, & Active Duty? 
 
Training 
 
 Describe LDAC 
 What training did you like the best?  Why? 
 Throughout your ROTC career, what do you feel is the most important training? 
 How did the training/people differ from the training/people at school? 
 What kind of training do you think will be most useful to you as an officer?  
Why? 
 Tell me about an average day at LDAC. 
 What was the weather like at Fort Lewis? 
 Tell me about your squad.  How were they alike/different that the rest of the 
platoon? 
 What was your favorite training exercise?  Why? 
 Tell me about PT.  Why is PT important or not important? 
 What did you expect from LDAC before you got there?  How was that different 
from the reality? 
 What do you wish you have known about LDAC prior to going?  Why? 
 What training did you find to be the most useful?  Why? 
 How did the BSU ROTC prepare you for LDAC?  To what extent was culture 
addressed? 
 How was your platoon alike/different from other platoons?  How was you squad 
alike/different from other squads? 
 
Culture training 
 
 Describe culture training at LDAC. 
 Do you think the culture training will be useful to you as an officer?  Why or why 
not? 
 Do you think the role players accurately portrayed a foreign culture?  Why or why 
not? 
 What do you think they should have done or said differently? 
 If you had to be a role player in this type of scenario how would you prepare for 
your role? 
 How successful was your team during the FTX/STX portion of LDAC?  What do 
you think contributed the most to your success or failure? 
 Who did you appoint to handle the “civilians on the battlefield”?  Why?  Was it 
always the same people or team?  
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 Who usually spoke with the “locals?”  Why?  What made them successful in that 
role? 
 What were the toughest things about balancing culture and your mission 
(FTX/STX lane)?  Why?   
 How do you think cultural knowledge can help you in accomplishing a mission?  
Why?  How can culture impede a mission? 
 How do you think culture will be different when you are deployed?  Why? 
 Did you use your teammates to “figure out” the culture?  How? 
 Did cultural knowledge help you accomplish the mission on your (FTX/STX) 
lane?  Why or why not? 
 Did you talk about the lanes (at any time) after mission completion?  What did 
you talk about?  Why? 
 How did you and your team prepare for the FTX/STX?  Was cultural knowledge 
part of you or your team‟s preparation?  To what extent? 
 How knowledgeable were the other cadets about culture? 
 What are the key aspects of American culture and which of them are likely to 
come into play working with someone from, e.g., Afghanistan? 
 If the Afghans value family and Americans value family, is that something that 
makes you the same? Is it something you can build on? If so, how might it work? 
What are the limits to such possible sameness? 
 What more would you like to know about culture, especially regarding those you 
will encounter, before being deployed? 
 
